

JPRS-WER-85-043

29 April 1985

West Europe Report

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ARMS. CONTROL

FRANCE

PITFALLS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM EUROPEAN VIEW

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Winter 84/85 pp 245-255

[Article by Francois Puaux, deputy permanent representative of France in the NATO Council (1958-1959); director for Europe (1964-1968), then director, of political affairs in the Quai d'Orsay (1972-1975); French ambassador to Italy until 1981; during which assignments he participated in drawing up, then implementing, the French position on all politico-strategic problems [as given in biographical footnote]: "A Dangerous Game: Arms Control"]

[Text] Historically, there have been cases of unilateral disarmament, the most famous being that of the United States at the end of the 1950's until the brutal awakening of the Korean War. But despite interminable conferences, there have /never [in italics]/ been any contractual disarmament agreements other than those the victors have been able to impose.

One need not be a great prophet to foresee, at the start of Ronald Reagan's second term, that neither will there /ever [in italics]/ be a genuine mutual control of arms. At best, one can expect certain accords, more for "window dressing" than useful. Indeed, there is no obvious reason why the grand deception of the last 20 years (it was in 1964 that Johnson spoke of SALT for the first time) should suddenly undergo a transformation tomorrow into a promising exercise. Obvious, on the other hand, are the reasons opposing the success of an undertaking for which so many politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are so insistently clamoring.

The Limits of Arms Control

I. First of all, arms control does not cover--and cannot cover--in its entirety the domain it seeks to regulate. The negotiators of the SALT agreements had to limit their discussions to a few types of weapons, arbitrarily defined as "strategic," that is, capable of striking the territory of the other superpower. The insufficiency of detail and the necessarily limited scope of the SALT agreements had two consequences:

a) The Russians switched their effort, successfully, to getting round the agreed ceilings by qualitative improvements to their missiles. They multiplied the number of warheads carried by their rockets, a technique (MIRV-ing) in which the Americans thought they had a 10-year lead.

b) They exploited unsparingly the field not covered by the SALT agreements, namely, that of the FNI's, or, medium-range (1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) nuclear weapons. They set out to achieve an overwhelming regional superiority in Europe (unflatteringly defined at the time as the "gray zone") by deploying their SS-20's--the "terror weapon"--against it.

The same danger stalks us today. The "zero option," the validity of which Washington reaffirmed during Andrei Gromyko's visit to Ronald Reagan on 28 September, calls for the withdrawal of all Euromissiles: The American Pershing 2's on one side, and the SS-4's, SS-5's and the famous SS-20's on the other. One fact that was simply forgotten was the one that Admiral Falls, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, had nevertheless pointed out on 21 June 1983: In the figurative "zero option" case, the Russians would retain in Europe their SS-22's, which are classed according to range (900 kilometers) just below the FNI's, but which can, with remarkable accuracy (of the order of tens of meters), threaten at one and the same time the FRG, France, England and the Benelux nations. London's International Institute of Strategic Studies reported at the beginning of October that the USSR had already secretly deployed 90 of these missiles on ultra-mobile automotive launchers inside the GDR and in Czechoslovakia. In the face of these revelations, can "option zero"--a formula that would maximize the decoupling between the United States and Europe, and the disputed authorship of which is curiously claimed by Helmut Schmidt, Ronald Reagan, Francois Mitterrand and even Valery Giscard d'Estaing--continue being unconscionably proposed? Negotiations concealing traps of this magnitude can hardly be expected to lead to "good agreements."

II. By a purely mechanical effect, arms control leads, in some cases, towards reflexes of a "Parkinsonian" type and to a quantitative rise in armaments. The delegations obviously make it a point of honor to obtain the highest possible ceilings, and they succeed not without making mutual concessions. According to General Gallois, "Had they been adhered to, the general lines of the negotiations concluded at Vladivostok in 1974 by Messrs Brezhnev and Ford would only have accelerated the nuclear warheads race: Had they deemed it advantageous to do so, the Americans could have deployed 20,000 of them in 1990, and the Soviets more than 25,000... while adhering to the letter of the so-called "limitation agreements." (1) It will be noted that the respective figures are: For the United States 9,792 strategic warheads and for the USSR 8,671, bombers included.

Added to this is the sometimes feverish desire that can seize American presidents to conclude a treaty. Witnesses have described the "frenetic final hours" of the 1972 horse trading in Moscow between a Brezhnev who was not yet ill and a Nixon 6 months away from his reelection. (2) And the Europeans cannot forget Jimmy Carter's desperate eagerness in June 1979 to conclude SALT 2, an agreement that finessed the hand of the Old Continent. Obsessed by their essential objective, the limiting of Soviet MIRV-ed ICBM's, the Americans agreed to a substantial reduction, for the next 2 years, of the range of land-based cruise missiles, rendering them inadequate for the defense of Europe, for which they had nevertheless been designed. There were, at that time, 90 SS-20's already in place on the Soviet side!

III. The prospect of a resumption of negotiations is producing another mechanical effect: Each side intends to use to the maximum the currently agreed ceilings, which are already higher than needed, as bargaining chips. Clearly, this is the case of the MX, the ICBM that is to replace the "Minuteman." The building of this huge missile, weighing more than 300 tons and equipped with 10 warheads, has been debated for so long (since 1973) that it is now outdated, for it is highly vulnerable. To be preferred over it, and in the offing, is the single-warhead-equipped "Midgetman," which is mobile and cheaper. The Congress has nevertheless agreed to the building of 36 MX's (the Administration wants 100 of them), on the promise that they will be negotiated.⁽³⁾ The Pershings are threatened by the same fate, as we shall see later herein. As for the Soviets, they are acting no differently: They are piling up SS-20's in Europe, as bargaining chips.

IV. Still a fourth problem with arms control needs to be pointed out, relative to the general conduct of East-West relations. In effect, negotiations in the arms domain risk skewing the course of U.S.-USSR relations, by occupying too much of the American Administration's attention. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger remarked recently, favorable though he is to the SALT agreements: "Arms control can stabilize sectors where war is not very probable, but it cannot do much to produce stability in sectors where it does not already exist." And lastly, we submit that the SALT agreements gave the Americans a false sense of security during the 1960's, which engendered a relaxation of their defense effort and which was not alien to the wave of pacifism that ravaged both sides of the Atlantic. The Kabul coup towards the end of December 1979 produced a rude but salutary awakening. Reagan's election was in large part owing to it.

Reagan and Arms Control

Ronald Reagan cannot be regarded as an arms control expert. Far from it. He has not taken great delight, as Kissinger did in his time, in juggling "carrying capacities," "launch weights" and "propellable weights." But he knows that what is involved is a dangerous and deceptive, perhaps inescapable, undertaking which can only be entered into from a position of strength. Long before his election, he had taken, on this point, the opposite course to Jimmy Carter, who believed firmly in the SALT agreements and had spoken this memorable sentence: "We have fought fire with fire, without ever thinking that to fight against fire the best thing is water."⁽⁴⁾ But Reagan is capable and prudent. Within his team, he listens with equal interest to both the partisans and the adversaries of arms control. He maneuvers not without dexterity between the pressure from the Churches and the partisans of a "nuclear freeze" on the one hand, and that of Senator Jesse Helms and the ultra-conservatives on the other.

The President is also very attentive to the "voice of the people." The polls give a very accurate picture of the feelings that motivate his fellow-citizens, even though they reflect a certain ambivalence with respect to this problem. By an overwhelming majority of 78 percent to 7 percent, Americans are convinced that the Soviets are not interested in any agreement that does

not give them the advantage. Almost as large a majority (75 percent versus 21 percent) doubts that the Soviets adhere to the commitments stemming from these accords. Despite this, 8 Americans in 10 (85 percent versus 15 percent) feel it is important for their country to try to establish better relations with the USSR. They accept the idea of a nuclear freeze but reject that of a unilateral reduction. In essence, they want approximate parity.⁽⁵⁾

Reagan's policy responds to and aptly reflects this deep-seated America. The President knows that not much good can be expected to come from arms control; but he has also understood that this issue has the force of a myth and that a frontal assault on it would be inadvisable. After taking the necessary time to get Congress to pass an impressive rearmament program, he opened with the Russians, on 30 November 1981 in Geneva, a conference on Euromissiles, in accordance with NATO's "double decision" of December 1979. The talks labeled START--which name (in which the term "reduction" replaced the term "limitation") aptly translates his maneuver, recalling that of Krushchev in the 1960's--began shortly thereafter, in Geneva, on 29 June 1982. The object was to make maximalist proposals that would hardly be acceptable but that would produce the effect sought on public opinion, taking the initiative away from the Russians, and leaving up to them the responsibility for ending the two Geneva conferences, concurrently with the arrival of the first Pershings in the FRG in November 1983. [This strategy] thus won the battle of the Euromissiles, to the great relief of the Europeans, who regained their feeling of security and became less receptive to pacifism and neutralism. It also gained time.

The presence of the Pershings, which the Soviets consider "strategic," since they can strike Soviet territory, changed the climate of things of a possible arms control; less, however, than did Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" speech of 23 March 1983. After talking of it initially as "science fiction," the commentators gradually came round to realizing that it was a credible initiative. All observers agreed on one thing: The President believed in his idea. He had believed in it for a long time. Already as far back as when he was governor of California, he had been haunted by the "despair" inherent in the strategy known as MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction]. To the surprise of his generals and admirals, he adopted straightaway the idea of an effective ABM [antiballistic missile] system, mentioned in his presence during a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1983.

Moscow must deal with this determination on his part.

An Uncommon Complication

SALT 1 and Salt 2 agreements (putting aside the protocol on cruise missiles) addressed only strategic missiles. SALT 3, had it taken place, would undoubtedly have addressed also Euromissiles and possibly FBS's [Forward-Based Systems] (meaning bombers stationed in Europe). The bursting in of space defense on the scene has completely upset the prospects for negotiations as viewed at the start of Ronald Reagan's second term. A pause is therefore in order in this regard before examining the problem of strategic missiles and FNI's.

To understand the emotion felt by the Russians towards the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], it must be recalled that the problem of ABM weapons represented the major difficulty of the SALT 1 negotiations. The exorbitant cost of the contemplated systems finally damped the ardor of the negotiators and brought about the treaty of 26 May 1972, which limited each side to two antimissile defense sites (reduced to one site each in 1974). The Americans decided to forgo this capability. The Soviets built a defense network around Moscow against nuclear-warhead missiles (the Galosh network), a rather rudimentary one, and stopped there. The possible necessity of a total defense of their territory, and the astronomical expenditures it would entail, suddenly place before the USSR a problem of the utmost seriousness.

The other aspect of Ronald Reagan's SDI concerns satellites, the indispensable outposts of all strategic defenses. It is not surprising that both sides would seek to destroy these embarrassing "watchtowers" before the start of any open conflict. Since 1971, the USSR has been testing a "killer" satellite that explodes in the proximity of the enemy satellite.⁽⁶⁾ The U.S. Air Force, for its part, is experimenting with a much more sophisticated anti-satellite weapon, the ASAT, which can be fired from an F-15 fighter plane and should be operational by 1987.

Immediately following Ronald Reagan's 23 March 1983 speech, the Russians reacted vigorously to his plan. In August, they instituted a unilateral moratorium on the orbiting of any further antisatellite weapons. They demanded that the United States do the same and submitted a project to the UN on the nonmilitarization of space. Moscow was echoed to some extent by the Europeans, who feared finding themselves "squeezed" some day between two impenetrable space-based defenses. Mrs Thatcher expressed reservations publicly on this point in July. Mr Manfred Worner, the FRG's defense minister, did likewise. France, for its part, went further: It proposed to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on 12 June 1984, the "very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, especially those that would be capable of bringing down satellites in high orbit, the preservation of which is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of the strategic balance." This proposal was not unfavorably received. Many, on the other hand, felt that Paris was annoyingly playing "into the hands of the Soviets" in proposing a prohibition of 5 years duration on all testing and deployment, on the ground, in the air and in space, of directed-energy weapons. The fact is that, had it been accepted, it would have blocked the American plan in its entirety.⁽⁷⁾

A vast disarray and indeed some anguish are visible on the part of Moscow, which risks seeing vanish in space the famous "strategic parity" so dearly achieved during the 1960's and recognized by the SALT agreements.⁽⁸⁾ The USSR has made the space issue the linchpin of its propaganda and diplomacy. This probably explains Mr Gromyko's 28 September visit to the American President who not very long before had been calling the Russians "liars," "cheaters," and (citizens of) "the evil empire." The USSR cannot but find it hard to resume dialogue, but neither can it avoid it. Whatever the state of Mr Chernenko's health or his successor's, Moscow is sure to pull out all the stops to delay the American space plan.

For Washington, on the other hand, to accept in advance of any discussion a prior moratorium would have been a defeat--virtually a capitulation--that would have compromised the SDI from the start. A certain margin for negotiation is nevertheless perceptible. Thus, a temporary moratorium could be agreed to for certain aspects of the plan if the Russians agree to a comprehensive overall discussion. Also, the idea of prohibiting weapons that can knock out high-altitude satellites (in geostationary orbit at an altitude of over 36,000 meters) is of equal interest to both the superpowers. And there is talk of a possible prohibition, binding on both parties, against developing more than one system each for low-altitude interception.

It must be added that the total protection by directed-energy weapons referred to in the 23 March speech is a very distant long-term objective, and that what is involved insofar as concerns the foreseeable future is an ABM defense of missile sites and not of populations. What is being referred to is the interception of ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (that is, during their reentry) by kinetic-energy weapons--a goal the American engineers are now in a position to achieve, as was demonstrated by the spectacular result of the test on the atoll of Kwajalein in June. If only 50 percent of the enemy warheads could be stopped in this way, deterrence would already be considerably enhanced. Europe would gain from it to the extent that the Soviet SS-20's could be knocked out by this system. At least, this is what the Americans explain to their more than hesitant European allies. As for France, it could retain for a long time yet its anti-cities strategy. MAD still has many long years ahead of it.

The Russians should not entertain too many illusions as to the effects of their campaign. Ronald Reagan is dead set on SDI; he believes in it. He has, he stated to the American Legion on 4 September, "a moral obligation to pursue this technological breakthrough." Washington will not make the marginal concessions referred to above unless Moscow agrees to enlarge the talks to encompass all weapons, and in particular the ICBM's such as the SS-18 and SS-19 (first-strike weapons that are especially menacing and destabilizing, and that have become the principal concern of the Americans since being equipped with multiple warheads). The Russians, whose strong-point these weapons are, will not be flexible, preoccupied as they are with "equal security." This is a demand which Washington has rejected as being incompatible with the SALT agreements, but which, from the Soviet viewpoint, is not unfounded. The fact is that the USSR could indeed some day have to face not only the United States but also, simultaneously, China, France and England. She wants therefore to possess as many weapons as all her potential enemies combined.

Is a horse trade possible as between space weapons and ICBM's? It is doubtful in view of the vital importance attached to these weapon systems by both sides.⁽⁹⁾ Secretary of State George Shultz would be quite willing to entertain such a horse trade. But Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is vehemently opposed to it. In his view, space weapons "are not a bargaining chip." The President will have to arbitrate, but it is clear that he will lean towards Weinberger's viewpoint.

The situation is different from the standpoint of the FNI's, which the two parties will be talking about at the same time during the talks that are to follow the Shultz-Gromyko meeting of 7-8 January in Geneva. In principle--Mr Gorbachev reiterated it during his 20 December visit to London--everything must be able to be invoked under the famous "umbrella" proposed by Ronald Reagan to save face for the Soviets. Various working groups are to be formed to deal with controversial issues within the framework of a single "forum," Moscow having "priorly" renounced its demand that the Pershings be withdrawn. As regards Euromissiles, the reciprocal abundance of "hardware" (572 Pershings and cruise missiles; 405, and tomorrow possibly 600, SS-20's, without counting the SS-22's) is such that reductions are contemplatable and have in fact been planned. (The figure at one time had got down to 120 SS-20's on the Russian side).

But to date, Moscow has refused to accept the deployment of any Pershings at all. In this, there is a potential danger for Europe.

Though not reflecting the Administration's position, some American circles would willingly trade off a renunciation of the Pershings in exchange for a reduction in Soviet ICBM's.⁽¹⁰⁾ Nor should it be forgotten that the compromise proposed by Paul Nitze, the negotiator at Geneva, and labeled the "walk in the woods," purely and simply abolished the Pershings, retaining only 75 cruise missiles on the American side versus an equal number of SS-20's. The Pershing, however, is the weapon systems-link par excellence between the defense of Europe and that of the United States.

The other major obstacle in the path of FNI negotiations is the Soviet demand that account be taken of the French and British nuclear forces in the Euromissiles balance. Paris and London are absolutely opposed to this. Their missiles belong to national deterrent forces embarked on submarines and cannot be compared (except for the 18 rockets on the Albion Plateau) with other than the 950 Soviet submarine-launched warheads.

On this point, the United States has always been very firm. It does not want to concede to the Soviets the advantage of the overbalancing of its theater nuclear forces in Europe by the Soviets, that would result from counting as part of the Allied arsenal 162 French and British missiles that are not under the U.S. command. What will happen in 1994, when France will have 496 warheads aboard its oceanic force, and England 512? It will hardly be possible to ignore this problem. Indeed, this is what Vice President Bush was hinting at in a statement on 28 September 1983 which caused somewhat of a stir. President Mitterrand has not precluded the idea of a conference including the five nuclear powers. However, he has placed difficultly realizable conditions on the reduction of the currently existent gap between the nuclear and conventional forces of the superpowers and those of the others. In any case, he stated in a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1983 that "It would be paradoxical for a country to depend on a conference in which it had not taken part."

Added to these mammoth difficulties is a problem which, with the advances being made in the ever more rapid miniaturization of weapons, becomes ever more difficult to resolve: That of monitoring and verification.

Let us put aside the different methods being advocated here and there for reducing armaments, like the "build-down" proposed by certain members of the Congress, with the President in agreement, which would consist of destroying two old warheads for each new one. This is a far more complicated method than its seeming simplicity would lead one to believe. Perhaps the soundest method would be that of "indirect arms control," wherein each country would unilaterally take steps that could be echoed positively by the other.

The "historic" artisans of the SALT agreements have lost their enthusiasm for, and do not appear to expect much to come from, a process which for the initiated has lost its magic. And this can only help Ronald Reagan. NEWSWEEK⁽¹¹⁾ attributes to Zbigniew Brzezinski the disenchanted statement that: "The time has come to stop believing that arms control is the secret key to friendly relations with the Soviet Union and even to the enhancement of mutual security." In the view of Jimmy Carter's former adviser, the latter must come about through a long, ambiguous process that demands unilateral actions on both sides. Henry Kissinger is saying the same thing when he writes: "There is no such thing as technological solutions to a political negotiation."

Therein lies the problem in its entirety. There is no substitute for trust, a trust that has never held sway, even at the height of detente. The SALT 2 agreements, said Ronald Reagan in 1979, are "fatally flawed." But if trust existed, would there still be the effort to "regulate" armaments? The circle is inherently a vicious one, and there is every reason to believe it will remain so for a long time to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pierre Gallois, *POLITIQUE ETRANGERE*, 1979, No. 1, p 51. These alarming figures are explained by the fact that, at Vladivostok, a limitation was placed on the number of multi-warhead missiles, but not on the number of warheads a missile may carry.
2. As regards the conditions under which political leaders are compelled to negotiate arms problems with the Russians, one can best cite Kissinger: "The process of arms control is dominated by experts who have studied these problems for years whose number far exceeds the number of hours the political leaders have devoted to them. The latter are compelled to extricate themselves from a mire of technical gobbledygook on which their diplomacy depends, but which they are not equipped to evaluate." *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE*, 30 July 1984.
3. In May 1983, the White House divulged the text of a letter addressed by the President to Representative Norman Dicks, in which Mr Reagan indicated that "The overall level of deployment (of the MX) will depend on the

Soviet strategic programs and on arms reduction agreements. Similarly, Mr Kenneth Adelman, head of the Arms Control Agency, admitted for the first time, on 22 June 1983, that the United States could forgo the MX on condition that the Soviets do away with a certain number of heavy missiles (essentially SS-18's). Noteworthy in this instance is the role played by Congress, which complicated the negotiation by imposing specific conditions on the appropriations it voted.

4. Jimmy Carter's response to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who pressed the United States to restore the balance in Europe that was destroyed by the Soviet SS-20's. Reported by Andre Fontaine in LE MONDE, 27 October 1983.
5. "A Talk with Louis Harris," THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Chicago, August-September 1982. These figures were confirmed by other polls analyzed by "Public Agenda Foundation," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, autumn 1984.
6. The USSR is believed also to have developed two ground-based test lasers, designed to "blind" enemy military satellites. These lasers are to be operational by the end of this decade. THIRD ANNUAL PENTAGON REPORT ON SOVIET DEFENSE.
7. Also seen therein was a contradiction with the plan introduced at The Hague in February by the President of the Republic, for a European military space station.
8. As to the Reagan Administration's quest for strategic superiority, see Robert W. Tucker, "The Nuclear Debate" in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, autumn 1984. The 1982 defense directive states: "The American nuclear forces must prevail and be able to compel the Soviet Union to seek the quickest end to hostilities under conditions favorable to the United States." The existence of a "prevailing strategy" was read into this. But Tucker points out that the "countervailing strategy" of Jimmy Carter's 1959 directive was not basically different. I would be tempted to say that it is the general tenor of the Reagan discourse on defense that gives the impression of seeking to exceed strategic parity, and certain statements, like Mr Weinberger's (NBC, 8 September), according to which, if the 1972 ABM treaty interferes with the American arms program, it must be abandoned. It is recalled that this treaty, which is part of SALT 1, can be denounced on 6-months advance notice.
9. The Soviets have proposed, under START talks, lowering the ceiling on land-based MIRV-ed ICBM's from 820 to 680. But this concession would still permit them to retain in service all their SS-18's and SS-19's, precisely those on which the Americans have set their aim.
10. See interview with Adm Stansfield Turner, former head of the CIA, in ETUDES POLEMOLOGIQUES, No. 31, 3rd quarter 1984.
11. 1 October 1984.

ARMS CONTROL

SPAIN

GROMYKO ON VISIT URGES RETENTION OF NUCLEAR-FREE STATUS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 85 p 13

[Article by Felix Bayon]

[Excerpt] The USSR is confident that Spain can contribute "in constructive fashion to the task of slowing the armaments race," Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko stated yesterday in Madrid in the course of a toast he offered at the conclusion of the banquet given in his honor by his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran, in Viana Palace. Gromyko also expressed satisfaction with the fact that Spain has decided not to allow nuclear weapons on its territory. Gromyko and his wife Lydia were entertained by the Spanish royal couple yesterday at the Zarzuela Palace, and after lunching at Viana Palace, the Soviet and Spanish foreign ministers continued the talks begun the preceding day for another 50 minutes before joining the technical delegations from the two countries for a meeting.

In his speech, Gromyko stressed the dangers which extending the armaments race to space would create, and he mentioned ailing Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko three times. "The interviews and negotiations we have had here in Madrid," he said, "are focusing on the problems which concern absolutely all peoples and states. Among them are prevention of the militarization of space, slowing the nuclear armaments race and avoiding the threat of a new war."

"However, there are individuals who issue challenges to the world public," he said later on, referring to but not mentioning U.S. President Ronald Reagan by name, and "they seem obsessed with drafting projects for the militarization of space," "pretending to pass it off for little more than a guarantee of weapons reduction." "Even the medieval scholars would have envied such logic," he said in conclusion.

Gromyko stressed the role which Spain can play in this problem, in his view. "Each state, large or small," he said, "has its own potential for contributing to the success of negotiations, or failing to do so." "In the Soviet Union," he added, "we have high regard, because of its just value, for the decision of the Spanish government to maintain Spain's status as a nation free of nuclear weapons. Does it not then suit the interests of Spain if the level of nuclear confrontation is not raised in Europe, and if there are no efforts

to challenge the existing, and above all, territorial, reality, and if the pan-European process based on the principles and provisions of the Final Helsinki Act is strengthened?"

The King and Democracy

The man who has headed the Soviet diplomatic service for almost 3 decades said later on that "the USSR and Spain can seek common views where the need to eliminate the centers of international tension by political means is concerned. But it is also certain," he added, referring directly to the United States again, "that events are occurring in the international arena wherein some want to impose their will on sovereign states and peoples, sparing no means, even using the force of arms."

In conclusion, and referring to Central America, he said that "it is necessary to put an end to the state terrorism practiced in international relations."

During the toast he offered, Fernando Moran made mention three times of the speech delivered by the king of Spain in Moscow last May, at the beginning of his tour of the Soviet Union, focusing on the passages in which the king praised the democratic system.

"We are absolutely convinced," Moran added, "that it is possible to achieve a balance at a lower armaments level, without thereby placing the legitimate security interests of each state in danger." The Spanish minister of foreign affairs said that "for obvious geographic, historic and cultural reasons, Spain is a part of the West and defends its values and way of life." "Now then," he added, "on the basis of this reality, it is our duty and our desire to seek and to maintain a certain margin of autonomy, which is nothing other than the defense of our national interests, a defense which does not seek to alter the balance of power, but which does not want to be subject to subordination of any kind either."

Apart from the exchange of impressions about the international situation which took place in Madrid between Gonzalez and Moran, on the one hand, and Gromyko on the other, the visit paid by the veteran Soviet diplomat to the Spanish capital seems to have had limited bilateral results. On Thursday, the delegations of both countries postponed the planned meeting when the talks between Moran continued beyond the time period originally scheduled. Yesterday the delegations met for only an hour and a half.

It was after 8:00 p.m. when Gromyko bid his Spanish counterpart, Fernando Moran, goodnight, in English, at the foot of the steps of the Santa Cruz Palace. "See you tomorrow," Gromyko said.

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CSO: 5200/2542

POLITICAL

FINLAND

REASONS FOR KOIVISTO'S POPULARITY WITH VOTERS ANALYZED

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 15 Mar 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Jaakko Okker: "He Who Laughs Last, Laughs Best"]

[Text] In reflecting on why the president of Finland has problems with the media while, for example, the president of the United States seems to withstand much tougher publicity, one must remember that the president of Finland has experienced unusually difficult pressures since the 1920s.

President Lauri Kristian Relander wrote in his diary on 23 October 1927 how he was disturbed by telephone when he was visiting relatives in Kilo: "The caller was my former colleague Santeri Kinnunen. He presented the matter in the following manner: 'Forgive me for disturbing you on a Sunday, but I am with forest officer Paavonen and he asked me to call. The reason that I am calling is that you should invite Paavonen and his wife to the reception at the presidential palace on New Year's Day. I also have not had an opportunity to attend such a function.' I must say that seldom have I been so dumbfounded as I was now, it was as if I had been hit on the head with a block of wood, I had a hard time finding the words to answer. Finally I said: 'I do not discuss such matters over the telephone.' Kinnunen's behavior is difficult for me to understand in any other way except that he was touched to some degree."

Since Relander's days pressures on the Finnish president have increased tremendously. The administrative machinery has increased its power manyfold so that the president as the holder of the highest executive power has become a very important institution. Urho Kekkonen showed how the statutes concerning the president's powers can be stretched if necessary in the manner of a rubber band. The media harasses Koivisto much more frequently and aggressively than Relander.

Mauno Koivisto said on the eve of his 50th birthday that he has observed how he always enjoys himself better when he is alone. Even as the president Koivisto has preferred to be alone.

Thus Koivisto has not -- in the manner of his predecessor -- attempted to be the bully in all possible issues. He has allowed the willing to rule and has parliamentarianized the use of power. This has not been understood by even

all the MP's. On Arkadia Hill they continue to grumble that nothing will come of this since there is no master of the house.

Koivisto has also not shown any special favor to his former party -- if not actually dividing it into quarrelling cliques. Thus many leading Social Democrats are also dissatisfied and criticize the president, who does not do anything -- not even maintain contacts with his party.

Koivisto has also not become the leading pr-man for the export industry. He has made industrial leaders recall how nice it was in the good old days with Urho and Paasikivi in Moscow...

Briefly stated: Koivisto has been the kind of president that makes the country feel a need for Kekkonen again. Praise he has not received -- as is known, ingratitude is the way of the world. Since the president has not exactly been criticized in his actual official duties, he has been made responsible for his son-in-law's business activities.

However, there is one quarter which justifiably puts up with Koivisto's loner role, a low-profile policy.

This quarter is the people.

Koivisto's electoral candidates received a total of 1,374,500 votes in the elections or 43.3 percent of the votes. There were also those who adopted a favorable attitude toward Koivisto even among those who voted for the other candidates.

Koivisto's popularity was extraordinary since a different kind of politician -- or an anti-politician -- was seen in him. The real politicians have lost face in attempting to politicize everything and in accumulating privileges, money, and power for themselves. It was hoped that Koivisto would be a national leader who would keep the politicians in check and who would also be a symbol worthy of the trust placed in him by the people.

The above-mentioned expectations are not fulfilled by carrying out a low-profile policy of a loner. Admirers with a short attention span have already lost faith. Koivisto has not kept the politicians in check, but, on the contrary, has joined with them in the same front in rebuking representatives of the media as lemmings and quarrelling with the Finnish Broadcasting Company.

According to a poll, 43 percent of Finns considered in January 1984 that Koivisto's lemming statement has increased his popularity while 38 percent believed it weakened the president's popularity and 8 percent thought that his popularity had remained at the same level.

Now when the effects of the dispute with the Finnish Broadcasting Company were assessed, 5 percent believed it had increased Koivisto's popularity while 40 percent thought his popularity had fallen off and a full 55 percent considered that his popularity had remained the same.

The figures seem to indicate that the people do not understand what the president and the Finnish Broadcasting Company were actually disputing.

In MTV's interview Koivisto accused the Finnish Broadcasting Company of a presidential play: "When it wants to transmit a program in which it is said that I have already announced for the next term, it means that I am already a presidential candidate and that all issues will be interpreted according to this."

In addition, Koivisto explained that he as a president does not even have the right to answer questions concerning another term.

It was, of course, grotesque that at one time the parties competed to be the first to request Kekkonen as a candidate for the next elections. It is good that Koivisto does not want to copy his predecessor in this respect.

On the other hand, an incumbent president is, however, always a potential candidate for the next elections -- unless he specifically declines. This particularly applies to Koivisto, who enjoys such a vast popularity with the people.

The self-evident truth of Koivisto's candidacy is further supported by the fact that not only have his opponents begun a presidential play, but also his left-wing supporters: Kalevi Kivisto, Bo Ahlfors, and so on.

Since Kivisto has been considered to be a well-behaved politician, his speech has been interpreted as an expression of gratitude for his gubernatorial position. Whoever doubts that Kivisto is not any more well-behaved than other politicians, may think that he used his speech to help out SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] Socialists who have found themselves in tight straits.

Former Chairman Aarne Saarinen of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] was angered by Kivisto's speech and wrote less politely:

"I do not believe that Kalevi Kivisto's popularity, for example, is based on the fact that he is a Socialist, but on his outward attributes, a clean appearance, manner of speech, and behavior. I am still of the opinion that Mauno Koivisto was also elected primarily on these bases. He was certainly not elected as a Socialist, hardly ever as a Social Democrat with real convictions. The situation being thus and the fact that there is still 3 years until the elections makes a commitment, indeed, premature. In my opinion, this does not have any ideological or political value at this time. Mauno has not done anything which would give reason to make him a candidate at this time for the 1988 elections except that he appointed Kalevi Kivisto a governor, which is, of course, a good thing. Or was it -- from the point of view of the SKDL?"

Kivisto's, Ahlfors's, and Saarinen's speeches have given Koivisto cause to sigh: I can manage even with opponents, but Lord protect me from such friends...

The moves of the opposing side in initiating the presidential game have been mere fumbling. Paavo Vayrynen's name has been brought up in Center Party

circles. The Conservative Party is planning the nomination of its candidate, and Harri Holkeri and Matti Jaatinen are at the top of the list.

Since the Conservative Party is the largest bourgeois party and the Center Party, on the other hand, recalls its former greatness, it will be extremely difficult for the bourgeoisie to agree on a common candidate.

In other words: If Koivisto wants to continue in a second term, his victory will not be threatened by anyone other than himself.

Inasmuch as Koivisto did, indeed, play his own game with the Finnish Broadcasting Company in order to avoid being included in the presidential play too early, he apparently miscalculated. According to the poll, the people did not understand his motives.

Such a result in and of itself accelerates the presidential game.

Since Koivisto does not understand why the presidential game should be played now already and since he is also suspicious, he may see the situation just as gloomy as did Relander, who wrote shortly after being elected: "These forces hostile to me have already begun to quietly move -- proof of this was obtained immediately after the elections. I had a premonition already then that these -- both public as well as secret -- personal opponents would come between the people and the chief of state to disrupt and tear asunder at the first opportunity.

10576

CSO: 3617/99

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CENTER, RURAL PARTIES REGISTER LARGEST GAINS IN POLL

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Mar 85 p 11

[Article: "Support for Large Parties in Decline"]

[Text] An opinion poll on party support, which was not supposed to be made public, was conducted in February. For various reasons we cannot report on the precise figures, but primarily on the direction indicated by the poll.

It appears that the support of all the large parties has declined since the last parliamentary elections. The Conservative Party and the SKDL have met with more than 2-percentage point losses. The combined gain the Center Party and the Liberals is around 1-percentage point. The SDP's popularity has fallen off a little less than this, but, nevertheless, it has declined.

The SMP [Finnish Rural Party] seems to have regained its support and it is now at the level of the last parliamentary elections or 9.7 percent. The party re-received 5.3 percent of the votes in the municipal elections.

In comparing support with whatever elections or opinion polls the undisputable winners are the RKP [Swedish People's Party] and the Greens. The latest poll indicates that the Greens have surpassed the RKP and are approaching the SMP.

The Christian League seems to be at a standstill in its support. The Constitutionalists are once again very near zero support.

The most dramatic drop in popularity was experienced by the Center Party if support in February is compared to last fall's municipal elections. Last fall the Center Party did very well. It received 20.3 percent of the votes in the municipal elections. On the basis of the poll it appears that the Center Party's losses have become the SMP's gains.

[see table on following page]

Support for Political Parties

Party	Parliamentary Elections 1983	Municipal Elections 1984
SDP.....	26.7	24.8
Finnish People's Democratic League.....	14.0	13.9
Socialist Total.....	40.7	38.7
Conservative Party.....	22.1	23.0
Center Party and Liberals.....	17.6	20.3
Swedish People's Party.....	4.6	5.1
Finnish Christian League.....	3.0	3.0
Finnish Rural Party.....	9.7	5.3
Constitutionalist Right Wing Party.....	0.4	0.4
Greens.....	1.5	2.9
Others.....	0.4	1.3
Center and Right Wing Total.....	59.3	61.3

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CS0: 3617/99

POLITICAL

FINLAND

POLL SHOWS VOTERS EXPECT KOIVISTO TO FACE OTHER CANDIDATES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 Mar 85 p 9

[Article: "Parties To Enter 1988 Elections with Own Candidates"]

[Text] The people expect the 1988 presidential elections to be normal elections, in which the parties will nominate their own candidates. At the present time, the people expect that President Mauno Koivisto will be the candidate of the Social Democratic Party only according to a poll commissioned by the Oulu Newspaper League (Center Party affiliated).

In the poll conducted by Finnish Gallup 896 citizens were asked about their views on the presidential elections. The results were made public on Saturday.

The respondents did not really see any alternative to Koivisto as a candidate of the SDP. Among the party's supporters, 90 percent thought that Koivisto will be the candidate the next time around also. However, 5 percent considered Chairman and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's candidacy to be a probability.

Half of all the respondents and 62 percent of Conservative Party supporters believed that the Conservative Party's presidential candidate will be Bank Director Harri Holkeri even 3 years from now.

It is wagered that Paavo Vayrynen will be the Center Party's presidential candidate. Among all the respondents 48 percent believed in Vayrynen's candidacy and 55 percent of the Center Party's supporters also agreed. Among the party's supporters 14 percent believed in Ahti Pekkala's candidacy and 8 percent believed in Johannes Virolainen's candidacy.

It is believed that Kalevi Kivisto will again be the candidate of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. Thirty eight percent of all the respondents believed Kivisto will be a candidate and 57 percent of the SKDL's supporters believed the same. Among the party's supporters 22 percent believed that Mauno Koivisto will be the SKDL's candidate.

10576
CSO: 3617/100

POLITICAL

FINLAND

STRATEGIES, PERSONALITIES IN CONSERVATIVES' PARLIAMENT GROUP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Mar 85 p 12

[Article by Pekka Ervasti: "Conservative Group Sets Stricter Opposition Line"]

[Text] If the sign on the meeting room of the Conservative Party's parliamentary group did not read Conservative Party but Bourgeois Parliamentary Orchestra, for example, what kind of music would one hear from behind the door? Does the group have the power of a symphony orchestra or does it make croaking sounds like an out-of-tune accordion band.

One needs a good political ear in order to hear any dissonance from the Conservative Party's parliamentary orchestra in its public appearances. The harmony, however, is more the result of timing than unbroken unanimity. The party is now experiencing a phase of political harmony in the parliament. There are even 2 years until the next elections. There are no pressing political disputes in its program. And even though the exhortation "Topple the government" is printed next to each day of each Conservative MP's calendar, the group seems to be resigned to the permanency of the present government. Therefore, the group is even labelled as being frustrated and lacking in vision.

Officially, this is, of course, denied. It is pointed out that it is possible to exert an influence even from opposition. This argument is just as convincing as the saying that joy without wine would be possible by means of some miraculous trickery.

A Business-Like Puolanne

Economist Ulla Puolanne from Lahti is formally the group's conductor, but the notes by which the orchestra plays are, of course, originally from the score of Chairman Ilkka Suominen.

Puolanne is praised for her objectivity and ability to smooth out the group's internal conflicts, but she is also criticized for being too pedantic and lacking creativity. It is being said that she does not assume sufficient responsibility for the social obligations belonging to the chairmanship. In general, Puolanne is among the first to leave when the coffee and cognac comes around at the group's evening functions.

Puolanne is a member of Suominen's rhythm section in the Conservative Party's parliamentary orchestra. The Conservative group's other significant clique has gathered around Pertti Salolainen, who lost to Puolanne in the elections for chairmanship. This clique includes Tapio Holvitie, Mauri Miettinen, Matti Viljanen, Iiro Viinanen, Martti Tiuri as well as the so-called three Riittas: Riitta Uosukainen, Riitta Jouppila, and Eva-Riittaa Siitonen. Also Tuure Junnila, a veteran of the right wing, is counted among those who consider that the Conservative Party should take more effective advantage of Salolainen's popularity and his ability to appear in public, an attribute polished by his tv career.

And Salolainen has not yet been played out. He is in a position of readiness to go in all directions. However, defeats have made him cautious. Relations with Suominen are cool, but correct.

In addition to Ilkka's and Pertti's batons, there are also those who march to a different drummer in the Conservatives' group. In addition to Junnila, who is travelling in the right lane, there are Helge Saarikoski and Pentti Maki-Hakola and discordant note Tauno Valo. Ilkka Kanerva, who wears the mantle of the party's security and foreign policy expert, plays solos on the group's opposite edge. Over the years he has accumulated considerable political ballast from his involvement in centrist cooperation.

The present state of affairs in which the party office and the party's leadership are operating under rather loose guidelines, suits those travelling on the right very well. Those on the group's opposite edge are hoping that Ilkka Suominen would blow more frequently and energetically into the leader's horn and shake the group out of the lethargy in which it is quietly dozing as under a mantle of consensus.

In spite of the quiet times, there is tension between the group and the party office. The gloomiest assessments indicate that communication with the party office is poor that not all the MP's even know where the office is located. On the other hand, there are complaints that the group is being looked down on in the party office. The emphasis of a conservative policy is, however, in the parliament at this time if it is anywhere in general.

New Blood

In the last elections 44 Conservative MP's, among whom 18 are first timers, were elected to parliament. The largest public controversy in the history of the group in connection with the budget negotiations in the fall of 1983 can readily be chalked up to inexperience. At that time the group walked forcibly over the leadership and rejected a negotiated agreement with the government.

Outright confrontations within the group have been avoided after this bitter experience. A slightly stricter opposition line has been adopted in parliamentary speeches. The new image includes snapping at the government at suitable intervals in the manner of a vicious watchdog. The present course pleases the representatives on the right edge, but frightens those promoting a cooperative line.

By polishing its opposition image the Conservative Party is, of course, aiming at an election victory. It is calculating hopefully that fresh forces will be taken into the government orchestra after the elections.

If the doors of government open up for the Conservative Party, will ministerial material be found from the present group? The question is almost insulting as far as the members of the group are concerned. They point to the present government with indignation. The rise of the Finnish Rural Party into the government is especially painful to the Conservatives. They declare that they are able to put up so many politicians capable of holding posts in the cabinet that in fact the Conservative Party will never be allowed to have so many minister's portfolios.

In the present group Suominen, Miettinen, Salolainen and the group's agricultural expert Toivo Pohjala, at least, could become ministers. Ulla Puolanne and Elsi Hetemäki-Olander could rise to petticoat positions in the government.

The Conservatives point to speaker Erkki Pystynen as a guarantee of their representative's presentability at court. Some have even grumbled that Pystynen has identified himself too much with the role of speaker and has forgotten his own party.

Rising Stars

Among the Conservatives who were elected to parliament in the last elections many have demonstrated their mastery of the bourgeois policy tune very well. Jouni J. Sarkijärvi, who broke all records in the Mensa intelligence test and who it is wagered will become the party's ideologist, a kind of Conservative Suslov, is one of the rising stars. Pirjo Rusanen, Kimmo Sasi, and Sakari Valli as well as Sirpa Pietikainen, parliament's youngest, have also shown development capability. Also Erkki Moisander's stock is rising.

Martti Tiuri has become the most controversial figure. Professor Tiuri's area policy opinions have not only annoyed Center Party members, but also Conservative MP's Jouppila and Valli from the north probably along different lines, however.

Among the newcomers there are also those whose line has not yet been clarified at least to outside observers if even to themselves. This group includes Kaarina Dromberg and Juho Koivisto, among others.

The party's second vice-chairman, Aila Jokinen, at least, will bow out of the next parliamentary elections if she is chosen for the leadership of the Professional Health Care Organization. Helena Pesola is slated to replace Jokinen as the party's vice-chairman. Lauri Impio, who ruined his chances for continuing in office in an ambiguous speech in an interpellation debate in 1984, will also most likely disappear.

The ticking of the political metronome, according to which the Conservatives' parliamentary orchestra conducts its exercises in harmony, is speeding up little by little. It is facing some important performances: the parliamentary and presidential elections as well as the party congresses after them. They will determine which strings will hold up in whose instruments and who will be left to play the reed instruments.

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER EXAMINES DEMANDS TO AUGMENT POWER OF PRIME MINISTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Prime Minister Also Needs Formal Power"]

[Text] Demands for strengthening the position of the prime minister may sound strange to a layman; indeed, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa is generally considered to be the country's most powerful politician, who seems to be leaving the president of the republic in his shadow more and more often. This situation obscures a perception of the question from the point of view of principles. In reality the prime minister's formal powers and opportunities to direct the work of his own government are more limited in Finland than in many other countries. Too much is left to a dependence on the prime minister's personal influence.

In Western Europe and in the other Nordic countries the prime minister's position as the leader of the government is clearly more important than here. The powerful tendency of the media to personalize politics emphasizes the prime minister's position in the press. Political scientists consider that the actual power of the prime minister is constantly increasing in Finland also. The premise adopted by the current president that responsibility for the management of domestic policy belongs to the prime minister points to the same direction.

The prime minister's position with respect to his own government is not, however, at all as strong as it appears from the outside. This already becomes apparent in the formation phase of a government. Each party participating in a multi-party government selects its own ministers without the prime minister having much to say about it. Such a development trend seems only to have become stronger. It is difficult to see any real means for changing it.

The prime minister does not actually have any kind of legal authority with respect to his own ministers. He is primarily their chairman. Each minister answers quite independently for his own area of administration. A minister can also decide when he wants to bring any particular issue up for consideration by the whole government. If for some reason a minister wants to withhold or delay a debate on a politically controversial issue, the prime minister does not have any formal means for resolving such an issue by the whole government.

Even though the deliberate obstruction of an issue by individual ministers for political reasons is quite rare, the present situation is not administratively satisfactory from the point of view of the prime minister. An attempt has been made to rectify this matter over the years. According to a committee report from 10 years ago, the prime minister should be given the right if necessary to bring an issue being held up in an individual ministry before the whole cabinet for deliberation. The attitude toward this proposal has been cautious primarily in centrist circles.

However, it is said that the government has agreed upon a previously shelved solution, which is somewhat more cautious than the old committee proposal. The prime minister would have the right to bring before the cabinet an issue which he wants from an individual minister for resolution by the whole government. Thus the power of decision would be transferred to the government's majority. The prime minister could also determine a time frame within which an individual minister would have to present an issue to the cabinet. Indeed, the expansion of a prime minister's rights is not very revolutionary, but in principle it is an augmentation to the present paper regulations.

An improvement of the prime minister's operational conditions also involves plans to condense the duties of the cabinet's office staff in the direction of a smaller-scale prime minister's office. The national planning section was transferred to the Interior Ministry in the beginning of 1984. The intended transfer of the section dealing with questions of cooperation with Nordic countries from the Foreign Ministry to the cabinet's office is inconsistent with this trend. Therefore, it is probably wise to abandon this plan even though many reasons would support such a move.

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CSO: 3617/99

POLITICAL

FINLAND

FORMER CP CHAIRMAN KAJANOJA WRITES AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WORK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Apr 85 p 26

[Article by Anneli Sundberg: "Finland's Most Tired Revolutionary"]

[Text] Books: Jouko Kajanoja, "Vallankumous ja 10,000 aanta" [The Revolution and 10,000 Voices], Kirjayhtymä, 1985.

Revolution is an answer to all things, loneliness, family problems, unemployment, low wages, if one is to believe Jouko Kajanoja. He has written a book about his experiences as a Communist in Finland. "Vallankumous ja 10,000 aanta" [The Revolution and 10,000 Voices] relates how a bourgeois boy by the name of Kajanoja became a Communist, even Finland's best.

After reading the book one can no longer believe that there are any Communists at least in the faction of the Communist Party led by Arvo Aalto. It is no wonder that Kajanoja's career as party leader was short. For him Finland is a country thoroughly corrupted by capitalism, a country in which even the workers' movement believes that capitalists have the people's best interests at heart.

Kajanoja longs for a revolution, and his dreams of a brave new world are not the craziest. He promises freedom and tolerance to subjugated, forcefully adapted citizens. Examples in the world do not frighten him. In his opinion we have much to learn from the working life of the socialist countries, for example.

The tone of his tolerance is, indeed, a little strange since he talks nostalgically about the underground era of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. Then it was really something to be a Communist. Certainly it would be more exciting than become a revolutionary in present-day Finland, in which the Communists laugh, the police are indifferent, and only a commercial book publisher shows any interest.

It is not at all the same as distributing pamphlets at the risk of one's own life.

Kajanoja's book is a mixture of personal history, political declarations, and a criticism of the machinery, all quickly put down on paper while awaiting more exciting times.

Will they come? If Kajanoja is even a little bit correct in his evaluation of Finland's rulers, then even Che Guevara would have been the funding director of the housing administration here.

10576

CSO: 3617/100

POLITICAL

GREECE

ESPIONAGE CASE REPORTEDLY INVOLVES TURKS, OTHERS

Alleged South African Involvement

Athens TA NEA in Greek 26 Mar 85 p 1

/Text/ Various information from reliable sources leads one to believe that the espionage case that came to light on Saturday is much more serious than originally thought. The two Greeks who are allegedly involved, Mikh. Demertzis from Mytilini (who has already been arrested) and G. Olymbios from Kalamaria (who is still being sought) handed over to the Turkish military --as well as the South African military attache-- secret data dealing with the infantry and air force order of battle in Thraki and the Aegean Islands.

According to information collected by TA NEA and according to information transmitted from TA NEA's office in Salonica as well as from the newspaper's correspondents in Mytilini and Kavala, Mikh. Demertzis had gone to Turkey more than 20 times over the past few months, while G. Olymbios used to visit a retired high-ranking KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ officer quite often whenever he was in Salonica. He had given the officer's home address (in November 1983) as his permanent domicile.

The Ugandan diplomatic passport found in Olymbios' home was in his name.

Olymbios had a permit to carry arms but Athens Security had taken away his revolver in April 1984.

The South African military attache "was serviced" by the net for the illicit supply of weapons for his country (which as is known is "cut off" from such weapons).

Olymbios had recently spent his time between Mytilini and the coast of Asia Minor.

The network included persons faithful to the dictatorial regime of K. Evren. These individuals used to come to Greece from time to time to be "harbored" by /Turkish/ minority services.

At one point, Mikh. Demertzis tried --at least-- to involve a retired high-ranking officer in the network.

For every "important" piece of information they provided they used to receive a payment of 10,000 to 50,000 dollars.

The State Security Service and the KYP Second Counterespionage Branch is now handling this case.

The Greek citizens who are alleged spies were spotted by security services back in March 1984 and had been under close surveillance since then.

The interest of the security authorities in these men began when they noticed the large number of visits they were making to Turkey, as well as the large amounts of money they suddenly acquired, money that was not justified through their business activities.

G. Olymbios had been seen over the past few years driving a deluxe Mercedes 480 that sometimes carried Swiss licence plates and at other times customs plates.

Mikh. Demertzis had often changed jobs but had recently normalized his activities to trading with Turkey.

As for the true role of the South African military attache in the overall affair, this has not yet been cleared up.

It is, nevertheless, believed that he was an "internal link" in the Demertzis-Olymbios "net" with the Turks, either using Olymbios to obtain illegal weapons for his country or using both of them.

Former KYP Head

Athens TA NEA in Greek 28 Mar 85 p 1

/Text/ Lt Gen G. Vambas (Ret.), KYP chief in the G. Rallis government, will be called by the examining magistrate to give evidence on Georgios Khr. Olymbios, the individual being sought by security authorities on espionage charges to the detriment of our country. The former KYP chief is a close relative (uncle) of G. Olymbios. In November 1983, G. Olymbios had declared Vambas' home (20 Papapetrou St., Kalamaria) as his permanent domicile.

In the meantime, the number one man being sought by Greek counterespionage services, a "phantom" as far as his neighbors are concerned and openhanded as far as his friends are concerned, namely G. Olymbios is still at large. In the meantime, M. Demertzis is scheduled to be taken to the 10th regular examining magistrates office this morning.

Taking part in the secret investigations on G. Olymbios are the State Security Service, the KYP Second Counterespionage Branch and the Attiki Security. High-ranking security officers in Salonica have let it be known that G. Olymbios may have already fled abroad. There are existing suspicions that he may be in Germany or Turkey.

According to information, the cooperation of the German police authorities will be requested for finding Olymbios in case he has fled to that country.

At any rate, Olymbios' traces were lost about a week ago, according to the investigation that was conducted. Perhaps he learned of Demertzis' arrest and realized that his turn was approaching and since he was the head of the spy ring he fled abroad.

Alleged Iraqi Involvement

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 28 Mar 85 pp 1, 7

/Excerpts/ The spy case to the detriment of Greece that involves agents of Turkey is assuming greater proportions. According to new data that the security services investigation is bringing to light, the Iraqi Embassy in Athens is also involved in the espionage case.

As has been determined, one of the two men charged, namely G. Olymbios who is still being sought, went on a rendezvous with his colleague Mikh. Demertzis --who was imprisoned in Korydallo yesterday-- using an Iraqi Embassy vehicle with diplomatic tags.

From this new piece of information it becomes evident that the Turks involved Arab diplomats in the case. Also involved was the South African military attache, Colonel Piotziter who appears to have used Demertzis and Olymbios as "sponsors."

The in-depth investigation by the security authorities is continuing. Consequently, new data are coming to light on the collection of military intelligence information by a whole "espionage net" in our country, information that was handed over to Turkey.

In the meantime, an immoral effort was noted, namely the involvement of Lt Gen G. Vambas (Ret.) (former KYP chief).

AKROPOLIS has communicated with the general who expressed his surprise over the published reports in certain newspapers. As he told us, Olymbios is, indeed, a relative but he has never lived at his home, as he said he did.

The Investigation

Salonica, 28 March--The investigation being conducted by the KYP for locating Giorgos Olymbios has now spread to Thraki. According to information, KYP agents "are combing" Thraki and especially Komotini because there is information to the effect that the accused has been seen many times recently. According to the same information, Olymbios used to visit the Turkish consulate in Komotini from where it is believed he received orders.

5671

CSO: 3521/238

POLITICAL

ICELAND

PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE IN EFFORT TO TOPPLE GOVERNMENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Mar 85 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar': "New Political Alliance"]

[Text] As is well known, two opposition parties rejected formally an idea from the People's Alliance about a "new political alliance" which Svavar Gestsson planned to lead. Public opinion polls show that the People's Alliance has just over half of the greatest support it has had in an election (22 percent in 1978). In the wake of the "rejection" of the Social Democratic Alliance and the Women's List, Bjorn Arnorsson, economist for BSRB [Federation of State and Municipal Employees] withdrew his membership in the People's Alliance. Staksteinar today will discuss various points connected with this issue, such as the THJODVILJINN interview with Svavar Gestsson last weekend.

Bungle

The DV (DAGBLADID-VISIR, rightist afternoon paper) said in an editorial recently:

"BSRB Economist Bjorn Arnorsson has withdrawn his membership in the People's Alliance. The People's Alliance has recently been trying to get other government opposition party members to form an alliance against the government under the slogan "new political alliance" but has not reaped the rewards of its efforts. The People's Alliance does not do very well in the opinion polls. What happened?

The DV continues:

"The past months should have been ideal for such a party (i.e. the People's Alliance). The government enjoyed the support of the majority for a long time but this support has decreased. The strikes last fall caused dissolution, an ideal time for an opposition party, or so one would think. The inflation spiraled. The public had been forced to suffer great cuts in wages and benefits.--But the People's Alliance continues to lose support...." Among the explanations Bjorn Arnorsson gives for withdrawing his membership

from the party is that the party organ, THJODVILJINN, makes do with pouring accusations over democratically elected leaders of the labor movement.... It was without a doubt at the suggestion of the party leadership that the main labor leaders were put out in the cold in the election of the leaders in the People's Alliance labor council several weeks ago. Bjarnfridur Leosdottir and other rebels against the labor leadership gained victory there.--There has been a long time disagreement between the People's Alliance and the Icelandic Federation of Labor....

"Irresponsible Dissenting Individuals"

The THJODVILJINN tries to reassemble the scattered pieces of the People's Alliance in an interview with the party leader last weekend. In this interview he speaks nastily about other government opposition parties:

"The irresponsible dissenting individuals who control the Social Democratic Party and the Women's List in Reykjavik should be criticized," says the leader of the People's Alliance and adds: "But I have also noticed that the supporters of these parties have declared their dissatisfaction with the lack of understanding of their party leaders...."

On the other hand, the party chairman avoids looking closer to home for the reasons for the People's Alliance disaster. One of the new NT [Progressive Party organ] political reporters who keeps looking to the People's Alliance in his reflections, thinks, however, that there might be something there that caused it. He says verbatim:

"History has been hard on the party," he says about the People's Alliance, "it has been in the government coalition from time to time without being able to demonstrate any concrete results of its government participation...."

"The party (People's Alliance) has marxist roots and within it thrives the theory of the worldwide revolution, especially now in recent times when a hardline and active nucleus of the Militant Communists characterizes all meetings of the party. These historic connections, however, turn many people away from the party and prevent the party from any growth possibilities."

The People's Alliance and the Progressive Party

The People's Alliance and the Progressive Party have formed a government coalition three times which all have left erosion behind. The new NT political reporter says about these parties:

"In any case, the People's Alliance is losing the leadership it had for some time on the left wing of Icelandic politics and the Progressive Party is becoming one of many small parties...becoming a small farmer's party with about 6 to 8 members in parliament. This is serious news for a party that used to be categorically the next largest political party in the nation, a party that had a majority in the parliament (1931), although the electoral district system helped in that case."

Yes, it is difficult to do the right thing in this world.

JPRS-WIR-85-043
29 April 1985

FOREIGN MINISTER, ALTHING DISCUSS NORDIC ZONE, NATO ROLE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 20 Mar 85 p 38

[Article: "Nuclear-Free Nordic Countries: 'Natural and Obvious That Iceland Participates in Discussion,' Said Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson said during debates in the United Althing yesterday on a parliamentary resolution on nuclear-free zones in the Nordic countries that he considers it natural and obvious that Icelanders participate in discussion and studies connected with it in order to formulate a clearer idea about what serves the security interest of Iceland and peace surveillance in the world in general.

Sponsors of the parliamentary resolutions are parliamentarians from all the political parties and they are as follows: Pall Petursson (Progressive Party), Eidur Gudnason (Social Democratic Party), Ellert B. Schram (Independence Party), Gudrun Agnarsdottir (Women's List), Gudmundur Einarsson (Social Democratic Alliance) and Gudrun Helgadóttir (People's Alliance). The resolution is as follows: "The Althing reiterates the policy pursued by Icelanders that nuclear weapons or missiles that can carry such weapons will not be deployed in Iceland, and resolves to elect a committee consisting of seven people that will study the conceivable participation of Iceland in a discussion on a nuclear-free Nordic zone."

Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, an alternate member of parliament for Svavar Gestsson, People's Alliance, made an issue out of a discrepancy in the government leaders' argument concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons in Iceland. There is a great difference between saying that such weapons are not allowed here except with the approval of the government and in saying that there will be no nuclear weapons in Iceland. Olafur Ragnar Grimsson pointed out that if the aforementioned parliamentary resolution would be passed, the foreign minister will have to change his policy in these matters.

Ellert B. Schram (Independence Party) said that he could not at all see that the approval of the resolution would weaken the position of Iceland or that it would affect its participation in the work of the Atlantic Alliance which he said was the strongest peace alliance of our time. The parliamentarian said that the resolution reflected the spirit of the majority of Icelanders.

In his speech, Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson emphasized that the debate on nuclear-free Nordic countries might indicate that nuclear weapons are present there now. People must keep in mind that there are no nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries. Reality is worth much more than any declarations. The minister said also that he did not see that a special declaration of nuclear-free zones in the Nordic-countries would increase the security of Iceland or any other Nordic country. Attention should rather be directed to debates about eliminating nuclear weapons where they now exist.

Geir Hallgrimsson also pointed out that although there are no nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries, these countries are threatened by such weapons and with that he was referring to the arsenals at the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic.

Many people have suggested that it is possible to fight a limited nuclear war but such ideas have only met with terror as the whole world would be at stake. The desire of the inhabitants of nuclear-free zones is equally unrealistic as is the idea of a limited war fought with nuclear weapons.

The foreign minister emphasized that agreements about nuclear-free Nordic countries must be a part of a broad agreement that is aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union carry the responsibility of keeping an agreement of nuclear-free Nordic countries.

Olafur Ragnar Grimsson spoke again and criticized the foreign minister for, among other things, intending to give the two superpowers authority to decide in matters of Iceland and other Nordic countries.

Gudrun Helgadóttir, People's Alliance, said that this round had been unnecessary and reprimanded Olafur Ragnar Grimsson for insinuating that the sponsors were not in full charge of their sponsorship of the resolution.

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson answered Olafur Ragnar Grimsson by saying that a unilateral declaration by the Nordic countries about a nuclear-free zone would in no way change the current situation. What matters is that other zones would also be nuclear-free.

More parliamentarians spoke but their speeches will not be discussed here.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

JPRS-WER-85-043
29 April 1985

LEFT SUFFERS SETBACK IN UNIVERSITY VOTE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 22 Mar 85 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar': "VAKA the Largest Faction Within the University"]

[Excerpts] VAKA, the association of democratic students, received five seats on the University of Iceland Student Council recently.

VAKA was short of only 19 votes to get 6 seats on the council and unseat the fifth representative on the Leftist list.

VAKA is now the largest faction within the University for the first time in 14 years, or since 1971.

Nineteen Votes Short of Getting the Sixth Seat

VAKA, the association of democratic students, has every reason to be pleased with the results of the recent University Student Council elections. In the elections, VAKA became the strongest faction within the University for the first time in 14 years, i.e. since 1971.

--VAKA received 657 votes, 39.9 percent (36.5 percent last year).

--The Leftists received 563 votes, 34.2 percent (40.0 percent last year).

--The Reformists received 382 votes, 23.2 percent (23.5 percent last year).

--The Humanists received 45 votes (2.7 percent).

The last time VAKA had such majority at the University was in the 1971 university elections but at that time it had only the Leftists to contend with. Now, however, the Reformists are in the picture and they seek their support in part from similar sources as does VAKA.

VAKA lacked only 19 votes in order to secure six elected representatives on the Student Council and topple the fifth person on the Leftist list.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

JPRS-WER-85-043
29 April 1985

COLUMNIST ON SUPPORT FOR RADAR STATIONS, NATO

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Mar 85 p 23

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar': "Radar Stations, People's Alliance and Research"]

[Excerpts] The Radar Stations and the Althing

The radar issue was debated in the Althing on Thursday because of the parliamentary resolution sponsored by Steingrimur Sigfusson (People's Alliance) and Kolbrun Jonsdottir (Social Democratic Alliance), not to build new radar stations in the Vestfirðir and in the Nordausturland. It can be assumed that the decision about whether to build these two radar stations is in the hands of the inhabitants in the immediate vicinity of the stations, if there is any validity in what the opponents of the radar stations in the Althing say. But that is not the case, as Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson properly pointed out. This is a matter that concerns the nation as a whole and any decisions about this must be taken according to the rules and regulations applying in such matters.

By stressing this point, the opponents of the radar stations are now indicating that the majority of the inhabitants in the Vestfirðir and the Nordausturland are opposed to the stations. The opponents are thereby grasping at their last straws.

There is every reason to seriously doubt that the majority of the inhabitants in these areas are opposed to the plans about new radar stations. Just the opposite has come to light. For example, interested people in four districts in the Nordausturland have rallied together and established an Alliance on Western Defense Cooperation.

Bjorgvin Thoroddsen, farmer at Gardur in Svalbardshreppur, said in an interview with MORGUNBLADID on Wednesday that debates about the matter had in no way damaged the cause of the people who formed the new alliance.

Curious Viewpoint

It aroused considerable attention recently when Reuter News Reporter Richard Wallis quoted Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson on the interest of the

Dutch to station an ASW aircraft here in this country. Other news from this same reporter after his stay here has not been expounded on by those people here who receive news cables sent from Reuter. In these news cables he reported, among other things, on interviews with leaders in the People's Alliance. It says in this news cable:

"Einar Karl Haraldsson of the leftist People's Alliance, said that there was unity now within the party on the need for obtaining more information from NATO. Haraldsson, who is on the board of the Icelandic Commission on Security and International Affairs, said it is natural for Iceland to have a representative 'at every level' within NATO. 'If you are in NATO, then be in NATO,' he said."

And later in this same cable from the Reuter news reporter it says: "Haraldsson said that some Conservatives even wanted Iceland to establish its own military and that NATO would hold military exercises in Iceland. But he predicted that this idea would meet with great opposition."

Einar Karl Haraldsson, was as is well known, the editor of THJODVILJINN [People's Alliance party organ] for years but is now the managing director of the People's Alliance. If what the respectable British news agency quotes him of having said is to be believed, then the People's Alliance has made a complete turnabout in its position on Iceland's membership in NATO. Instead of being opposed to the membership, the party has as its top priority that Iceland's participation in NATO is as active as possible, that there is no reason to be against anything but an Icelandic military force and NATO exercises in Iceland.

The question must arise when and where did the People's Alliance make the decisions about its new policy in these matters and whether in fact this influential man is sincere.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

JPRS-WFR-85-043
29 April 1985

ALTHING DEBATE ON RADAR STATIONS REPORTED

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Mar 85 p 36

[Article: "Radar Stations: 'Necessary Surveillance Within Icelandic Jurisdiction,' Says Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson"]

[Text] "The status of radar stations in surveillance systems is recognized everywhere in the world and is in accordance with the SALT Agreement and the Helsinki Accord," said Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson in the United Althing yesterday. "The renovation of the radar system here is a part of our participation in the defense cooperation of Western states, but primarily it is the natural technological progress in the necessary surveillance of traffic, our own and others, in the air and at sea within our economic zone. The radar stations strengthen the overall security surveillance in this country."

"Military Radar Stations"

Steingrímur J. Sigfússon (People's Alliance) introduced a parliamentary resolution yesterday which he is cosponsoring with Kolbrún Jónsdóttir (Social Democratic Alliance) "to abandon all plans to authorize the building of two new military radar stations in Iceland." The resolution asks that the government "reject all requests that it might receive to construct such installations on Icelandic soil."

Sigfússon said that plans to build radar stations in the Vestfirðir and in the Nordurland Eystra will promote increased military activities in the country and that it is a part of the escalation of the arms race and might even promote a reaction from the Eastern Bloc. The radar stations would entangle us in the armament net rather than move us away from it and it would increase the strategic importance of the country which is not a desirable objective. In addition, these plans involve various Icelandic public institutions, such as the Post and Telegraph Administration and the Coast Guard, in the activities of a foreign military force in the country and would make them economically dependent on such activities.

Defense Security and the Country's Independence

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson said that Iceland had opted to ensure its defense security and independence by its membership in the Atlantic Alliance, the defense cooperation of Western democratic states, which has ensured peace in our part of the world from its founding, i.e. for almost 40 years. In fact, the Atlantic Alliance is the most effective peace alliance in the world.

The foreign minister said that the strategic importance of the country is based on its geographic location and that was clearly demonstrated in the Second World War. If there is a conflict between the East and the West, which hopefully will never come about, the main emphasis will be put on cutting the sea routes from North America to Western Europe. This is an obvious fact.

The purpose of radar stations, both the existing ones and the planned ones, is to monitor all traffic within the Icelandic air space and territorial waters, our own traffic and other traffic; to monitor vessels and aircraft that enter our jurisdiction with our permission--and others that enter without our knowledge.

The minister stressed that we have conducted the air traffic control for a large part of the North Atlantic which more than 10,000 air passengers travel every day in the summer months, although only a small number of these passengers make a stopover here. The continuation of this air traffic control in our hands is highly dependent upon being able to use the most advanced technical equipment in conducting this control in the near future. State of the art radar stations are therefore quite relevant in this continuation.

In addition to the aforementioned, state of the art radar stations are of great importance in monitoring domestic flights and naval traffic around the country, as well as for weather forecasts and monitoring ice drifts, etc.

There are radar stations in Sweden and Finland that can reach the Soviet Union and there is no fuss made about that. Radar stations in this country so far away from the Soviet Union can in no way be considered a threat as the spokesmen of the People's Alliance maintain, as they do not extend beyond our jurisdiction.

Only those who enter within our jurisdiction will be detected by these radar stations, whoever they are.

Support for Steingrímur Sigfusson's Proposal

Sigríður Duna Kristmundsdóttir (Women's List) read a resolution from the Women's List about security affairs, which she said was of the nature that the Women's List would sponsor the resolution to abandon all plans to build new radar stations here. She quoted from a report from the Icelandic Commission on Security and International Affairs in which it definitely mentioned "military installation such as radar stations." It means nothing that only a few people signed the petition of the people of Vestfirðir, as the people who signed were representatives of their own region.

"We want to maintain defenses," said Sigrður Duna Kristmundsdóttir, "but we have different opinions about how to go about the defenses. We emphasize disarmament and not increased military activities. That is the feminist outlook on life."

Páll Petursson (Progressive Party) said that there was no danger for the immediate vicinity from installations of this type. This, however, involved a project that is funded by a military budget. He said that we must accept an unchanged situation in defense affairs but he does not want to increase military activities. I do not want to sponsor such projects against the will of the inhabitants. For that same reason I would not support the building of an aluminum plant in Eyjafjörður. Petursson stated that this is his personal opinion and that he was not speaking for the Progressives in general.

Kolbrun Jónsdóttir (Social Democratic Alliance) said that she favored Iceland's membership in the Atlantic Alliance. She said that she is, however, opposed to increasing the number of radar stations. If such stations are necessary for our own security in air and sea traffic, we must build such stations with our own funds. I also feel obligated to consider the opinions of the inhabitants in these matters.

Support for Renovation of the Radar System

Eidur Guðnason (Social Democratic Party) said that the position of the People's Alliance and its echo, the Women's List, did not come as a surprise. He said, however, that the position of the Social Democratic Alliance took him by surprise if Kolbrun Jónsdóttir was speaking on behalf of her party colleagues in the parliament.

This is the question of whether to be in or not to be in a defense cooperation of Western states. Those who want Iceland to withdraw from this defense security provided by the membership, must make it known what they want to replace it to ensure the security interest of the country and the people. Neither the People's Alliance nor the Women's List have done that.

Bjarn Dagbjartsson (Independence Party) said that there was no clear certainty available about a majority opposition in Langanes to the radar station there. The founding of an Alliance of Western Defense Cooperation by an interest group in the Norðausturland demonstrates viewpoints that agree with the desire of a large and undeniable majority of the nation. He quoted Stafan Valgeirsson (Progressive Party) at a meeting in Þorshöfn about the security importance of radar stations. He said on the other hand, the position of Páll Petursson demonstrated an increasing opposition among the parliamentarians from the Progressive Party on a matter that is being handled by the ministers from the Independence Party.

Karl Steinar Guðnason (Social Democratic Party) said that when looking closely, that this proposal was about whether or not we should remain members of the Atlantic Alliance; whether we were sincere in our membership and showed in action whether we wanted to promote the best possible security and defense equipment. The radar station equipment at the Keflavik Base is 30 years old and the time has come to renew the whole radar system in general.

Magnus Reynir Gudmundsson (Progressive Party) said the crux of the matter to be that the majority of the nation feels that the defense interest of the country is safest by the membership in NATO. "We should be totally active participants in this defense cooperation and not only the recipients. I declare my confidence in the foreign minister, said Magnus Reynir, and I support the formulated policy the government has pursued in foreign affairs and security affairs. If the presence of these radar stations strengthens, as well as being a part of the defense surveillance, air safety in the Vestfirðir and increases the safety of seamen off the Vestfirðir, it encourages me--rather than discourages--to support the building of the radar stations if I am in the Althing when this will come to vote."

Others spoke but that will not be discussed here.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CONSERVATIVES' CHIEF WARNS COALITION PARTNERS ON SDI RIFT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Apr 85 p 9

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "If the parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party is not satisfied with the cooperation in the government coalition, I hope that in the future he will bring up problems in the proper forums. And solve them there. Not in the newspapers." Conservative Party chairman Erling Norvik said this to AFTENPOSTEN after Harald Synnes had warned of trouble in the coalition over space weapons.

It is hard to interpret the following statement from Harald Synnes as anything but a warning that there could be trouble:

"The disagreement in the government coalition over Norway's position on the production of space weapons will confront the government with far more complicated problems than it had in the disputes over soccer pool funds, the pornography law and opening hour regulations."

Synnes told STAVANGER AFTENBLAD that the Conservatives are not exactly in line with KRF [Christian People's Party] and SP [Center Party] when it comes to Norway's stand on the production of space weapons. But he did not think this would lead to a government crisis.

The KRF parliamentary leader also rebuked Prime Minister Kare Willoch. He thought it was unnecessary for Willoch to ask for a vote of confidence on the soccer pool issue.

"The request for a vote of confidence on the part of the prime minister could give the impression of unnecessary drama. No one in Storting thought the Labor Party would get a majority to support the proposal suggested by the Labor Party which Hanna Kvanmo of SV [Socialist-Left Party] took up."

Erling Norvik pointed out to AFTENPOSTEN that no matter how well the parties pull together in a three-party coalition, there are always some problems.

"The parties have not always started out with similar views on a number of issues. And in the course of a Storting period there will always be

situations in which everyone must be willing to make concessions in order to arrive at an overall solution. By and large Kare Willoch's coalition government and its parliamentary base have done this very well. That is also the reason why it has achieved results that an increasing number of voters have expressed satisfaction with in the opinion polls."

Points for the Opposition

Norvik said it is management ability, efficiency and results that have created the confidence that is needed for the government to be voted in for 4 more years in the fall election.

But now one of the coalition's parliamentary leaders has issued a warning of what might be called internal star wars.

"I hope this 'warning of trouble' that the KRF parliamentary leader has now found it opportune to issue will not lead to any weakening in cooperative efforts on the part of his party's Storting group.

"Such a change would only benefit the opposition," said the Conservative chairman who continued:

"If the parliamentary leader of KRF is dissatisfied with the cooperation among the government parties in Storting--or with the cooperation between the government and its Storting groups--I hope, as I said, that in the future Synnes will take the problems up in the proper forums. And solve them there. Not in the newspapers."

6578

CSO: 5200/2560

29 April 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

OTELO CANDIDACY PROMOTED--About 50 ex-militants and officials of the MES [Movement of the Socialist Left], the PSR [expansion unknown], the UDP [Popular Democratic Union] and the PC(R) [Communist Party (Reformed)], as well as a number of trade union leaders met in Setubal and decided to support the presidential candidacy of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a source close to the meeting stated to ANOP [PORTUGUESE NEWS AGENCY]. Participants in the meeting, which took place over the weekend, analyzed the basic principles of the "struggle program" and decided to promote district meetings to gather proposals to be presented at a national meeting in Lisbon on 11 May. This meeting will have the final word on the "struggle program" that will then be submitted to Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho for his approval. If the program is accepted, the search for partisan political support will immediately be initiated. The same source said that Otelo's eventual candidacy is already being supported by nationally known personalities. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Apr 85 p 20]

CSO: 3542/158

POLITICAL

SPAIN

BASQUE BISHOP ADVOCATES INDEPENDENCE, ANGERS RIGHT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Mar 85 pp 22, 23

[Interview with the Bishop of San Sebastian, Jose Maria Setien, by Jose Luis Barberia]

[Text] It might be said that this bishop considers creating scandal to be a virtue. The most conservative factions on the Spanish right "rend their garments," figuratively speaking, when they hear his name. The groups in the middle who proclaim their attachment to the Church are now remaining quiet, and their silence is a censure. Even the minister of territorial administration rushed in to describe the bishop's latest statements as "profoundly regrettable." This time he had only to say, in response to a question asked in a colloquium, that the independence of Euskadi is a perfectly pursuable objective. Only the ultraright seems to be somewhat more benevolent in its attitude to him. Now they are asking only that Jose Maria Setien be taken to court. Setien, anathema!

Jose Maria Setien was born in Hernani in 1928, the son of an architect. He has a brilliant ecclesiastical career behind him. In 1955 he obtained a doctorate in canon law and a master's degree in theology in Rome. At the age of 44, he was already auxiliary bishop of San Sebastian, after holding the positions of vicar general and dean of the Pontificia University of Santander.

A thoughtful and intellectual man, he says that the scandal created by his remarks is the same that the Basque issue has aroused in some political circles. In these times, Bishop Setien has adopted these words as his favorite saying: "I would rather sin because of carelessness and be free, than sin by excessive caution and lose my freedom."

Question: The Basque bishops have been portrayed to broad sectors of Spanish society as quarrelsome persons who frequently exceed the proper limits of their pastoral teaching role. What are the trademarks of the Basque church?

Answer: Those which are derived from its position in a specific environment and in a difficult social, cultural, and political context. The Basque church, because of its closeness to the people, shares their problems, from which it can not and does not wish to remain apart.

Question: Why have there been so many scandalized reactions?

Answer: Perhaps they are the same reactions that the Basque issue itself has aroused in some specific members. One of the trademarks of the Basque church is precisely that it does seek the implications which the evangelical message has for the political arena.

Question: What do you think of the reactions of the Spanish conservative right and the criticism by the minister of territorial administration?

Answer: They greatly surprised me, but more than anything else, they are of much concern to me, because those reactions demonstrate a severe inability to reason on political issues. The attitude of the minister, as a representative of authority, seems particularly serious to me, as it makes it difficult to create a climate of peaceful and democratic coexistence. I wonder if we are actually moving forward in terms of being able to reason on political issues and in overcoming instinctive reactions and edginess.

Question: Is it true that most of the comments made by the Basque bishops are directed toward the nationalist community?

Answer: It is sufficient to review the content of our pastoral teachings to see that that is not so. There are certainly references to Basque problems, but those references should not be confused with a nationalist position. I believe that it is important for the Church to discuss the Basque issue and its necessary institutional ramifications, because a people who lack any institutional outlets are a people who can not create their own true identity.

Question: It is taken for granted that the Basque bishops sympathize with the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party].

Answer: There may be an explanation for that. The bishops' desire to get involved in issues of concern to the people forces them to seek out what is meaningful and legitimate in the proposals--let's call them "abertzales"--and that obviously creates a feeling of drawing near, of sympathy. Now, whether that drawing near follows the PNV line... I would say that there are some points of agreement with the political proposals, but not a positive desire to seek identical positions.

Harassment From Two Sides

Question: At this time, when you are being insulted and abused by a number of groups in Spain, do you find a lack of support from the state ecclesiastical hierarchy?

Answer: The term "state ecclesiastical hierarchy" suggests a relationship of subordination that doesn't exist. The Bishops Conference is not a hierarchy that is interposed between the Holy See and each one of the bishops, but rather an "encounter group" for working together. To answer your question, there have been signs of fraternity or sympathy to me, not very many, and not very public, except for one: Cardinal Tarancon did make a public statement. In general, I believe that the other Spanish bishops are maintaining a position of respect for the autonomy of the individual churches, an attitude which I recognize and appreciate, because showing full support can also lead to criticism of some bishops by others. I prefer that respect, even though on occasion one has to shoulder all the responsibility alone.

Question: How is the double harassment--Basque radical left and Spanish conservative right--working? Do you feel you're being closely watched?

Answer: Before anything else, I want to make it clear that these specific controversies do not reflect my normal pastoral behavior. Bishop Setien can be seen in the towns of the province, talking with the parish councils, with children, people who are ill and elderly people, just like any other bishop. I don't feel persecuted; I try to let nature and normalcy guide my activities. It seems to me that in that way I am freer to act and to speak. It is possible that there may be something unconscious going on, but I would rather sin because of carelessness and be free, rather than sin by excessive caution and lose my freedom. On the other hand, that double harassment may suggest a positioning of the Basque church in a center where I am not placing myself intentionally. What I want--I don't know if I will get it--is to follow a line independent of specific political positions, a line consistent with the doctrinal needs of political ethics.

Question: Are you calling for a right to dissent that goes beyond the limits of the Constitution?

Answer: Yes; in the first place, everyone speaks of the possibility of changing specific aspects of the Constitution. This means that the political process of the Spanish state has still not been completely concluded. So, I have to say that my pastoral actions and my ultimate reference point do not have to be the Constitution, but rather what I understand by an ethical and moral order. In the strictly political area, I have to respect and obey the demands of a just political order, and within that just public order we also find the Constitution. I keep my own personal political opinions to myself so that they will not interfere with the exercise of my pastoral action. That is why it bothers me so much when my actions are attributed to specific political positions.

Joint Pastoral Letters

Question: Does the idea of the plurality of the state that the Basque bishops are advocating have a direct reflection on the Bishops Conference?

Answer: In principle, and it could not be otherwise, the configuration of the state of the autonomous regions has been accepted by the Bishops Conference. It is also true that we, the Basque bishops, are displaying special sensitivity on the issue of the autonomous regions, as a reflection of the sensitivity of the Basque people themselves.

Question: Periodically, there is criticism of the fact that the Bishop of Navarre joins with the rest of the Basque bishops in signing joint pastoral letters. Some people see in this an attempt to expand the present autonomous Basque map beyond its true political situation.

Answer: I would like to turn that statement around, because the problem is just the opposite. We are trying to respond to a sociological situation, to some true needs, and we believe that reality should be reflected in the ecclesiastical order by a common ecclesiastical province. Now, it isn't up to us to say whether that situation should have a political extension or not.

Question: But still, the Basque ecclesiastical province has not been recognized on the current ecclesiastical map of Spain.

Answer: No, it has not been formally constituted, even though in practice we do function as an ecclesiastical province in the present legal-ecclesiastical map, especially on issues of a pastoral nature. Pamplona is included with San Sebastian, Jaca, and Logrono, and Burgos with Vitoria and Bilbao. This reorganization was proposed by my predecessor, Jacinto Argaya, and it is one of the issues now awaiting approval from Rome.

Question: Does the Basque church project also include the diocese of Bayonne?

Answer: There are relations with the Church in Bayonne, which is also Basque, especially on matters related to the publication of liturgical books in Euskera. Those relations deal with pastoral action and socio-cultural matters. There is a Basque people in Spain and a Basque people in France. If a political dimension is seen in the existence of these ties, it must be because there is a political intention to prevent such relations.

Question: Is the political tolerance that you advocate--the right to dissent, flexibility in your ideas on the plurality of the state and self-government of Euskadi--morally compatible with the timeless nature of religious dogma?

Answer: One thing has nothing to do with the other. Definitely! I wonder if that idea might not reflect a politicized view of dogma or perhaps a religious interpretation of politics. A political reading of dogma could cause us to bring into dogma the more or less compelling ideas of politics, and in the opposite case, we could bring into politics the immutable rigor of dogma.

Question: People say that the Basque bishops are critical and progressive in areas such as human rights and public freedoms, but as conservative as the others in the area of individual freedoms: sexual relations, morality, genetics experiments, abortion, divorce, etc.

Answer: That question suggests that in some circles people seem to believe that the defense of human rights and of public freedoms is an indicator of progressiveness and that the maintenance of individual ethical standards is a sign of conservatism. Let me ask this: is it conservative to speak out against abortion and progressive to denounce torture? It seems to me that would mean ignoring our pastoral teachings.

Question: If we changed the terms of reference of that question, and spoke of sexual relations and torture, would your answer be as intense?

Answer: We would have to deal with the issue in depth: in my opinion, sexual permissiveness is dehumanizing, as sexuality must be integrated with the achievement of personal growth and development, while respecting life.

Relations with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]

Question: How are relations between the Basque church and the Basque political parties? The pastoral letter on the LOAPA [expansion unknown] drew very harsh criticism from the PSE-PSOE, and later that party asked to take part in a dialogue with the bishops, a dialogue which has apparently not yet taken place.

Answer: There was very strong criticism of our pastoral letter on the LOAPA, and we were told that this was an issue that the Constitutional Court would resolve. The PSE-PSOE asked for a dialogue because of another pastoral letter which I published on police intervention in Hernani. Our reply was negative, as we, the Basque bishops, did not speak with any political parties; however, we did say that we were prepared to receive them as we would any other person, regardless of their creed or political position.

Question: What is the Church's role in trying to avoid a split into two separate communities?

Answer: The ecclesiastical perspective encompasses only a Christian community with different cultural expressions, and our position is to reaffirm the cultural identity of each community, to respect the rights of all, to seek manifestations in which cultural diversity is respected. I certainly do not think that Euskadi should be the result of two juxtaposed communities. In the long run, that would make it hard to live together in peace. The Church should be critical of the possibility of two separate communities being created.

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CSO: 3548/107

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

ONLY CONSERVATIVE PARTY HAS CLEAR CAMPAIGN PLATFORM

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "An Unclear Picture"]

[Text] There is obvious unrest in the political parties. Prior to past elections issues of conflict and also the political front line have been much clearer than they are this year.

That was definitely the case in 1976. For over a decade the nonsocialist parties had had a power shift in their programs. And gradually this mutual front demand brought the three parties closer together. Differences of opinion on other issues were toned down since the demand for a power shift was so self-evident and so dominant.

Paradoxically this concept of a power shift survived the collapse of the first three-party government. Prior to the 1979 election the demand for a non-socialist government was also in the foreground although of course there had been an increase in uncertainty and lack of clarity.

Before the 1982 election the wage-earner fund issue had increasingly replaced the government issue as the glue that held the three nonsocialist parties together.

The political task has also been quite clear in the past for the Social Democrats. In 1976 it was a matter of stopping an anticipated attack on the Social Democratic welfare state. Its own movement was quite clear that this was the primary task. And it became even clearer to Social Democratic activists as time went by that this was the major political issue.

Prior to this year's election it is really only the Conservatives who have an equally clear picture of what they want. The basic explanation of Sweden's economic problems is that the public sector is too large and taxes are too high. The task in both the short term and the long term is to reduce public involvement and lower taxes.

But the other parties feel uncertain.

It is symptomatic that the Social Democrats have not even made an attempt to present a crisis program this time as they did before the 1982 election. The party's activists know that even a Social Democratic government can be forced to make social cuts. Policy in the event of an economic downturn is also an unknown factor. Anxiety is beginning to mount in LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions], for example, that not even a Social Democratic government can keep open unemployment down if the economy weakens again.

The Center Party is experiencing problems of an almost existential nature. Those who are active in the party today have become accustomed to thinking that they and their party leaders are dominant in the nonsocialist camp. The Center Party was the biggest nonsocialist party. Thus nonsocialist exercise of power occurred on the terms set by the Center Party.

The party is now dangerously close to the situation of being the smallest nonsocialist party. It is back at the level at which its predecessor, the interest-oriented Farmers' Union, found itself before it started expanding.

It is true that the Liberal Party has a new party leader, but the party cannot be entirely new, of course. Before the election the party must project a different image of itself than that of the Conservative Party's somewhat smaller brother.

When the Liberal leaders now go around the country meeting the party's potential campaign workers they encounter the same ideas and concepts as the former party leaders.

Quite naturally this means that to some extent the party is wearing its old costume.

All three nonsocialist parties want a three-party government. And this desire is felt even more strongly by voters for these parties. But it is no longer an equally clear joint demand that such a government be formed.

The Liberal Party wants it to reestablish itself as a major party. The Center Party can hardly say no as long as voters are not seeking parties that want to stay outside a three-party government, or more precisely say that they want to do so. And the Conservatives want a majority government so they can implement their policies.

A coalition government has increasingly become a means rather than an end.

Obvious mutual front issues are lacking in the nonsocialist camp. And the labor movement also lacks an issue that would decisively unite the movement and be embraced by everyone with equal fervor.

Thus Sweden has probably returned to more normal conditions than those that prevailed in the period from 1976 to 1982.

This year the picture is less clear. And therefore uncertainty is spreading in political life.

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

STILL ANOTHER OF 'PALME'S BOYS' LEAVES SDP GOVERNMENT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson and Anna Jerden]

[Text] Undersecretary Ulf Larsson, often mentioned as a prospective defense minister, plans to leave the government to become director of social affairs in Stockholm. If that happens Olof Palme will lose yet another of his closest colleagues.

A handful of other political appointees has already left the government for outside jobs.

Ulf Larsson would become head of Stockholm's social affairs administration, succeeding Arne Borg who is leaving on 1 July. From what SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned he is also the best qualified among the 10 people who applied for the job.

Being director of social affairs in Stockholm is comparable to being the head of one of Sweden's biggest businesses, with around 30,000 employees and a budget of 6 billion kronor.

"I was asked by the Social Democratic Party group to apply for the job," Ulf Larsson told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

The matter will come up at the next meeting of the Social Affairs Board on 18 April. A decision will probably be made then. The board will not meet again after that until 30 May.

Prospective Minister

Ulf Larsson is one of the people who is most often mentioned as a prospective successor to Anders Thunborg as defense minister if the Social Democrats win the election this fall. He worked in the Defense Ministry from 1974 until the government changed hands in 1976 and then continued to work with defense policy and security policy for the Social Democratic Riksdag research secretariat.

The social affairs directorship will formally be filled on 1 July, but from what SVENSKA DAGBLADET has been told it is not unlikely that it will remain vacant for several months. Ulf Larsson could then remain close to the prime minister until the election if he chooses to do so.

Involved Since 1950's

Olof Palme and Ulf Larsson have worked closely together since the 1950's. After receiving a Licentiate of Philosophy degree in history, Ulf Larsson came to what was then the Church Affairs Ministry (later the Ministry of Education) in 1959 and rose to undersecretary before transferring to the Defense Ministry.

When the Social Democrats returned to government power in 1982 Ulf Larsson became an undersecretary with Olof Palme with the primary responsibility of coordinating government work and contacts with the various ministries.

He also has a past in municipal politics. In Huddinge, where he now lives, he has been vice chairman of the municipal council and a member of the delegates' council. At present he is an alternate on the Social Affairs Board.

Many Have Left

Another of Palme's close colleagues, Odd Engstrom, left for City Hall earlier. Like Ulf Larsson he was an undersecretary on the cabinet council's working committee when Stockholm Finance Commissioner John-Olle Persson enticed him to come to work as finance secretary. Odd Engstrom was also mentioned as a likely candidate for the job as social affairs director, but he did not apply for the position.

There are others who have left the cabinet council's working committee:

Bill Fransson was Palme's speech writer in the first period after the Social Democrats returned to power. After an interim period as budget director in the Finance Ministry he is now executive director of Pripps.

His successor as speech writer, Staffan Kellerborg, has moved to LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] and works there as press spokesman.

Future Group Depleted

Deputy Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson's so-called future group, which is also part of the cabinet council's working committee, has been depleted too. The first to leave was Anders Isaksson, who went back to his job as journalist. Lena Askling also returned to journalism while Sten Johansson left the cabinet council's working committee to become general director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, SCB.

Ulf Larsson is competing for the job as social affairs director in Stockholm with the following applicants:

Jan-Olov Thomsgard and Lars B. Strand, both currently in charge of different social districts in Stockholm, Jan Ording and Marianne Rambro of the Social Affairs Board, Gunilla Larsson, in charge of family consultation at Huddinge Hospital, Lennart Skoglund, director of Huddinge Municipality, Eide Segerback, director of Fritzes Book Store in Stockholm, Walter Bonden, author, and Kjell Jacobsson, secretary of the county division of the Municipal Union in Stockholm.

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CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PALME'S SUPERCILIOUSNESS SEEN IN FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Patronizer"]

[Text] If one wants to get a picture of conditions in Swedish politics one should read the exchange between Olof Palme, Carl Bildt, Thorbjorn Falldin and Ulf Adelsohn in the foreign policy debate ("Minutes of Riksdag Debates 1984/85," No 107, pp 47-64). There is a lot to think about in this connection.

The prime minister's five speeches have a consistent theme: a desire for mutual understanding and a generous willingness to forgive and forget. Olof Palme gave the Conservatives "an enormous chance," he deliberately overlooked "all Bildt's provocations," he has done "everything to unite the nation" while at the same time welcoming a "free and open debate even on foreign policy."

This theme was also heard in the statements of the foreign minister earlier in the debate, but with the important difference that Lennart Bodstrom concentrated on the conciliatory spirit of his opponent, Carl Bildt, while Palme merely stressed his own.

The prime minister's drive for unity was mainly expressed in two questions he asked Ulf Adelsohn to answer. He hinted that a yes or no answer would be sufficient. The whole thing could be settled "in 10 seconds."

"Do you or don't you think the government is operating with a double message in relation to the Soviet Union? Do you or don't you think the government is behaving deferentially to the Soviet Union?"

The questions were answered by Carl Bildt, although he did not say yes or no. The prime minister was not satisfied--"I am not interested in Bildt--but wanted an answer from Adelsohn. He was the one who was given the unique opportunity to clarify the Conservative Party's foreign policy in 10 seconds.

When the Conservative leader did not respond directly to the questions the prime minister became angry. To be unconvinced about his innocence on the

two points mentioned is the same as making "an unprecedented accusation against the government." It means that "they think the government is secretly going along with a major power."

In the final exchange the two questions had assumed fateful proportions. "Mr Adelsohn refused to answer them. That in itself is an unprecedented insult, not to me personally but to the Swedish Social Democrats and what they stand for. Never forget that! It means that Mr Adelsohn is saying: We have our knives ready. When we get the chance we will try to stab you in the back."

Palme's method of building up his accusations is more than bizarre. The two questions are meaningful simply as a way of demanding an apology for Conservative statements in the past. But Palme did not make clear which sins he was referring to and he knew that it makes a bad impression to demand an apology.

One of his aims must have been to condemn two linguistic expressions: double message and deferential behavior. Critical statements that include these words must be regarded as "lese majeste." It does not matter whether the criticism concerns major or minor issues, security policy or diplomatic etiquette. The words "double message" and "deferential" should not occur in discussions of foreign policy.

But a great many other things are permissible. One can accuse one's opponents of "duplicity" and say that a change in government would involve "a grave danger for Sweden's peace." And it is all right to claim that the opposition made statements to the effect that "the government is made up of a group of traitors" and that an unimpeachable official is a Quisling.

No parliamentary debate involving Palme proceeds without his saying things that a person of his disposition can build up into a major indignant drama. This time he broke the record for self-pity. He took a nonstatement by the Conservative leader and blew it up into an unprecedented insult, a knife in the back, a blow beneath the belt.

Foreign policy debates can be somewhat stifling when they try to smooth over disputes and differences between parties. But discussions like the one Olof Palme initiated on Wednesday really have nothing to do with foreign policy. They involve the pecking order. The prime minister wants to determine what is permissible. The Social Democrats have a big reserve of confidence among the voters as guardians of neutrality and he is using that to give himself interpretation rights in all foreign policy issues. The prime minister will decide who is to speak on behalf of the Conservative Party. What Carl Bildt says as the party's official spokesman is disregarded except in the sense that every injurious statement is blamed on the party for an unlimited period of time. The prime minister does not ask that the Conservatives clarify their policy; he wants them to submit to a ritual. The form is what is important, the right person has to appear, only prescribed formulations are approved.

Olof Palme suffers from a superiority complex and unfortunately it has not diminished over the years.

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PAPER DISCERNS THUNBORG DISAGREEMENT WITH PALME

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Thunborg's Clear Differentiation"]

[Text] It must give Palme satisfaction to put down his opponents. But at this point the security policy exercise does not seem to be anything that will be hailed by the Social Democratic newspapers as a major success in the approaching election.

A hard struggle with the Conservatives in this area does not create enthusiasm and inspiration in the SDP's own ranks prior to this year's campaign. After the statements in last week's foreign policy debate the prime minister has been sharply criticized by people within the party, most recently by his own defense minister, Anders Thunborg.

The prime minister may have overestimated the remaining anger in the labor movement against Ulf Adelsohn after the general policy debate almost 2 months ago. The Conservative leader not only initiated a vote of no confidence in Lennart Bodstrom. He also suggested among other things that Palme's defense of the foreign minister could be interpreted as meaning that his "inmost thoughts" also expressed "the true feelings of the government."

Therefore it was not unreasonable--as the prime minister wrote in AFTONBLADET on Saturday--to clarify the parties' ideas in "the last foreign policy debate before the fall election." But the Conservatives approved the government statement's central points on security policy. Ulf Adelsohn's response to Palme's direct questions did not mean that he thinks the "government is really conciliating a foreign power and is in some way dealing underhandedly with that power" just because Palme says so.

The prime minister is virtually alone in thinking that "it is no longer possible to talk about a fundamental agreement among the Riksdag parties on Swedish security policy." It seems more likely that Palme has driven the Conservatives to exercise increased caution and to realize the need for stressing solidarity--though not in a way that will benefit him personally.

The party leader's strong position as the driving force in the election gives him considerable leeway in his choice of arguments, points of attack and

general tone. But the press organization that is expected to back him up has expressed unprecedented doubts about his judgment in dealing with the Conservatives and with foreign policy.

These Social Democratic newspapers have little sympathy with the party leader's course of action or his conclusions. It is quite evident that Anders Thunborg had a similar reaction.

It can be pointed out that the defense minister lacks clear party ties in the Social Democratic movement. He has also announced his intention of leaving the government, which gives him more leeway than he would otherwise have. But the fact remains that a member of Palme's own cabinet has stated an opinion that is totally different from the one held by the head of the government.

From an appearance on the news program Sunday evening it appeared that now as always Thunborg believes we should concentrate on the things that unite us; the same message appeared in an interview in EXPRESSEN. In sharp contrast to his chief, the prime minister, the defense minister does not want a confrontation over security policy. He does not look forward with the least enthusiasm to the prospect that the rifts could become a major element in the election. Thunborg also continues to say that he hopes that the Defense Committee made up of parliamentary representatives will agree on the security policy report that will be submitted later this spring.

The fact that the prime minister attaches great importance to the wording of the report is apparent from earlier bouts with the Defense Committee. Agreement here between the Conservatives and the others would certainly clash with Palme's talk about "fundamental" differences.

It will be more important to see the arguments when the committee starts to race toward a statement of views on future defense appropriations. On the basis of his determination to decide what is to be allowed in the debate on security policy, Olof Palme has said that there could be differences in views concerning the exact size of defense appropriations. Although perhaps not great differences.

A report in DAGENS NYHETER yesterday said that the American administration and conservative research institutes in the United States were critical about an erosion of Sweden's defense. But appropriations increases of the size these dissatisfied gentlemen would like would not even be considered by the Conservatives in terms of practical politics.

The question of how the outside world evaluates Swedish security policy depends on more than the military strength of the defense system. It also depends on how we conduct the debate. Differences in opinion must be expressed. But it is vital not to give the rest of the world an exaggerated picture of Swedish disagreement. In this area the prime minister himself has the greatest responsibility.

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CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

OFFICIAL DENIES DIVISION BETWEEN PALME, THUNBORG ON SECURITY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 85 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The government agreed to ask the two questions about Swedish security policy that Prime Minister Olof Palme put to the Conservatives in Riksdag's foreign policy debate last week.

People in the prime minister's office told DAGENS NYHETER this after it was pointed out that Defense Minister Anders Thunborg held a different view.

The two questions Olof Palme asked in the debate were:

1. Do you or don't you believe that the government is working with a double message in relation to the Soviet Union?
2. Do you or don't you feel the government is behaving in a deferential way in relation to the Soviet Union?

People in Prime Minister Palme's office told DAGENS NYHETER that the government discussed the two questions prior to the debate and that there was agreement that they should be presented during the foreign policy debate.

It is quite certain that the cabinet members most immediately affected, namely Lennart Bodstrom, the foreign minister, and Anders Thunborg, the defense minister, were included in the discussions.

Palme received no answer to his two questions in the foreign policy debate from Conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn. Palme was later criticized by some Social Democratic newspapers for his choice of words and for the fact that the debate became very rancorous.

After the foreign policy debate the government gathered for a meeting at Bommersvik to discuss foreign and domestic policy issues before the fall election.

"At the meeting, which was also attended by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg, a summary of the foreign policy debate was made," one of those present told DAGENS NYHETER.

The summary showed that Palme had not received an answer to his questions and that in that case the the questions should be asked again on some other occasion.

In an article in AFTONBLADET on Saturday Olof Palme returned to the foreign policy debate.

He wrote:

"Under the present circumstances it is no longer possible to talk about a fundamental agreement by the Riksdag parties concerning Swedish security policy."

After that sweeping statement was made Defense Minister Anders Thunborg spoke to the Ostermalm Social Democratic Society. Thunborg basically repeated views that he has presented in several different speeches over the last 2 years.

A leading theme in these speeches has been that one should not exaggerate differences of opinion on Swedish security policy, that it is more important to stress what unites us rather than what divides us.

This has been interpreted as a direct criticism of Palme's conduct in the foreign policy debate.

Even if Anders Thunborg stands behind Olof Palme's two questions to Conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn there are certain subtle differences between the two members of the government. These differences can be explained by the fact that Palme is the one attacked by the Conservatives while Thunborg is praised for his willingness to reach an agreement.

People in the Defense Ministry do not exactly share Palme's view that after the foreign policy debate there is fundamental disagreement concerning Swedish security policy.

In the current budget year there is disagreement on only 250 million kronor in funding for a defense budget of 22 billion, a ministry spokesman pointed out to DAGENS NYHETER.

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CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

THUNBORG REJECTS 'POINTERS' FROM NATO ON SECURITY POLICIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 85 p 12

[Article by Harald Hamrin]

[Text] "We do not need advice or pointers from NATO about how much we should spend on our defense system. We determine Swedish security policy ourselves."

That statement was made by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg in response to an article in DAGENS NYHETER yesterday.

The article contained remarks by an American research worker and representatives of the American Defense Department and the Pentagon.

According to official American views Sweden should invest more in its defense system. The research worker quoted in DAGENS NYHETER, Manfred Hamm of the Heritage Foundation, a research institute close to the Reagan administration, said among other things that both the navy and the air force have been weakened in recent years.

The investment ratio in the total defense budget has also been reduced, according to Hamm.

Two official representatives of the Pentagon, Richard Perle and Dov Zackheim, did say that they had complete confidence in the Swedish neutrality policy, but at the same time they felt Sweden could do "more" for defense.

"The purpose of Sweden's defense system is to defend Sweden--not to serve as a shield or spearhead for anyone else," said Anders Thunborg in a comment on the American charges that the "erosion" of Swedish defense has had negative consequences for the defense planning of NATO and the United States.

Thunborg also rejected several of the concrete figures cited by the Americans.

"If one looks at the statistics, Sweden's defense effort, measured in terms of the ratio of the defense budget to GNP (Gross National Product), is higher than comparable figures from the neutral or small NATO countries in Europe," said Thunborg.

"In terms of fixed prices our defense spending has been fairly constant since the beginning of the 1970's. We also maintain a very high investment ratio measured on the international scale."

Thunborg also pointed out that in the event of war Sweden can mobilize 850,000 men, quite a bit more than most other countries.

"We also have a modern air force and our decision to invest close to 40 billion kronor in the JAS [fighter-bomber-reconnaissance plane] should show the rest of the world that we are serious," Thunborg said to DAGENS NYHETER.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

OZAL VOWS TO ADMIT ALL BULGARIAN TURKS INTO TURKEY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 14 Mar 85 pp 1,11

[Text] Turkey and Bulgaria have expressed diametrically opposite views regarding the emigration of Turks from Bulgaria. While Bulgaria declared that it will not negotiate the issue of emigration with the Turkish government, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said: "We are prepared to bring them to Turkey even if there are a million of them."

Prime Minister Ozal denied a report by the West German television station ARD to the effect that he had met with Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov during Soviet President Chernenko's funeral in Moscow.

According to a report from Belgrade by the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, Dimitri Stanichev, a secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee, ruled out any talks with the Ozal government on the issue of the emigration of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria to Turkey.

According to the report, Stanichev said in a speech to villagers in Blagoyevgrad in southwestern Bulgaria: "Bulgarian citizens will not emigrate to Turkey. There will not be any negotiations on this issue between Bulgaria and Turkey."

The Ozal government has on several occasions expressed its concern to Sofia in connection with forced name changes in the Turkish minority. The Bulgarian government has insisted that the Turks have been changing their names voluntarily.

According to the Tanjug report, Stanichev reiterated this claim during his speech to the villagers. Stanichev said: "The process of our citizens voluntarily changing their Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian names has spread spontaneously."

According to Tanjug, Stanichev also said that the condition of Turks in Bulgaria is Sofia's internal affair. He added: "We will not discuss this issue with any country. No part of the Bulgarian nation belongs to any other country. This is the determined and unchangeable position of Bulgaria on this issue."

Speaking to foreign journalists from Athens two days ago, Prime Minister Ozal said: "No one in the Islamic world will believe that Turks in Bulgaria have

[voluntarily] changed their traditional Islamic names to Christian and Bulgarian names. As I stated before, this is a test for socialism."

Ozal's Denial

Prime Minister Ozal denied a report by the West German television station ARD to the effect that he had met with Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov during funeral ceremonies for Chernenko in Moscow. Ozal, who returned at 11:30 pm last night together with Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu, said in response to journalists' questions on this issue: "I did not have any meetings with Zhivkov. I only saw him while he was coming down the stairs."

Upon being reminded of Dimitri Stanichev's remarks to the effect that "there will be no negotiations with the Turkish government about Bulgarians of Turkish ancestry," Ozal said: "I do not know about that. We have not heard anything from anyone else yet." Minister of State Mesut Yilmaz, who was in the greeting party, said: "We have not received an official response from Bulgaria. We are still waiting."

Ozal also stated that during his one-day visit to Moscow to attend Chernenko's funeral he had the opportunity to meet with Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov, U.S. Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, the prime ministers of Canada, the FRG, Norway and Spain, the president of Romania and other officials. He added: "Measured by this yardstick, our visit was extremely successful."

ARD's Report

The West German television station ARD had reported that two days ago Ozal had a meeting with Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov who was also attending Chernenko's funeral. ARD claimed that Ozal told Zhivkov that "Turkey is prepared to accept the entire Turkish minority in Bulgaria as immigrants." The West German television did not state, however, when and under what conditions the said meeting took place and did not report any other details about the meeting.

According to a report by CUMHURİYET's Ankara bureau, Ozal responded to questions about the Bulgarian issue by journalists from Athens. Ozal explained how President Kenan Evren dispatched his secretary general to Bulgaria upon "hearing that something was happening in Bulgaria" and how he demanded in his message to Zhivkov that serious incidents be prevented. Ozal continued:

"In his message of reply, Zhivkov expressed his readiness to send immigrants to Turkey, but he claimed that Turkey did not want to accept them, that he is certain that [former prime ministers] Demirel and Ecevit stated at the time they were in office that the agreement on immigrants had been completely implemented and that if we insist on incidents that never occurred in Bulgaria he would go on radio and television and publicize the fact that the Turkish government did not agree to an immigration program. Now we are telling them that we are prepared to admit all Turkish-Bulgarians into Turkey even if there

a million or more of them. With its population of 50 million and with the help of its Islamic friends, Turkey is prepared to help others to end this tragedy and to close this wound."

Anatolia Agency to Send Correspondent to Bulgaria

The Anatolia Agency notified the Bulgarian embassy in Ankara that its Board of Directors has decided to send a resident correspondent to Bulgaria. Minister of State Mesut Yilmaz stated that the decision was based on an agreement signed between the Anatolia Agency and the Bulgarian news agency BTA in 1972. If Bulgaria agrees, Anatolia Agency correspondent Cihangir Gener will report from Sofia, Varna and Filibe for 3 months. The news agency will later send a resident correspondent to Bulgaria.

A march will be held in Brussels on Sunday to protest the repression of Turks in Bulgaria. It was previously reported that permission was obtained from the authorities for a demonstration in Istanbul on 21 March. The march from Yenikapi to Sarachane will begin at 1:00 pm.

It is also reported that a seminar entitled "The Drama of Turks in Bulgaria" and organized by the Turkish-Saudi Friendship and Cultural Association will be held in Odakule on Saturday.

9588

CSO: 3554/110

POLITICAL

TURKEY

TURKISH MINORITY PROBLEMS IN BULGARIA

Bulgarians Oppress Turkish Minorities

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 20 Mar 85 p 9

[Article by Haluk Soysal]

[Text] Hayrettin Erkmen, a former minister of foreign affairs, who spoke at the dinner organized by the Rotary Club around the topic of "Turkish-Bulgarian Relations", said "We must bring before international forums the genocidal measures initiated in Bulgaria against our fellow Turks."

Hayrettin Erkmen, dwelling on the historical evolution of Turkish-Bulgarian relations, said the following: "It is clear that when the Bulgarians forced Turks to emigrate in the years 1949-1950, their attempts at genocide did not stop at name-changing only but were backed by emigration. Turkey's response to that emigration was mild at the time. Assimilating minorities and bulgarianizing them is done with the aim of eliminating an increasing Turkish population in Bulgaria. In fact the Bulgarians who, after 1950, caused difficulties again in 1981 for the Turks who went to Bulgaria, do so to impede Turkey's speedy opening up to the outside as its economy grows stronger."

At the meeting, which took place at the Hilton Hotel, Hayrettin Erkmen pointed out that "To convince world public opinion of the justice of our cause we must keep the issue alive," adding, "We must see to it that this matter is evaluated from the human standpoint in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Preventive Plan Ready

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 20 Mar 85 pp 1,11

[Text] While disclosing that no reply had been given yet to the second note Turkey sent Bulgaria on 4 March, it was also announced that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared a three-step preventive plan on the Bulgarian question. The director of the Information Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yalim Eralp, said: "We are trying to solve the problem with Bulgaria within a framework of neighborliness and good will."

Furthermore, three separate demonstrations have been organized in Paris, Strasbourg and Istanbul to protest the measures against Turks in Bulgaria. The protest demonstrations will take place on 23 March, Saturday, in Paris and Strasbourg and on 19 March, Thursday, in Istanbul (tomorrow).

Eralp, who disclosed that a three-step preventive plan had been prepared to solve the problem, mentioned that the measures were short, medium and long term and spoke to the effect that "When the time comes those measures will be implemented. In fact their implementation has already begun."

As Eralp answered journalists' questions concerning the matter yesterday, he said that while they had received no reply yet from Bulgaria to the Turkish note, they were still hoping that a positive answer might be given. Eralp pointed out that within the framework of human rights the pressures exerted on Turks in Bulgaria would attract the world's attention, and in answer to another question he also disclosed that in the course of the Ozal-Tikhonov talks which took place in Moscow, together with the matter of the pipeline they had also touched on the subject of Bulgaria. In reply to a question as to whether the pressures exerted on Turks in Bulgaria would affect the natural gas project, since the pipeline would be going through Bulgaria as well, he said: "We would prefer this project not to suffer any delays."

SODEP [Socialist Democratic Party] leader Erdal Inonu, in the declaration he made in connection with this subject, said: "We are following carefully and anxiously the pressures exerted on our fellow Turks in Bulgaria. It appears that the problem will not be solved easily. By continuing to show attention and care we must obtain the protection of our fellow Turks' rights as defined by international agreements."

The Association of Turkish Parliament Members has also organized an open session on the topic of "The History of Turkish-Bulgarian Relations and the Pressures Exerted on Turks in Bulgaria." The open session will take place at the Anadolu Club on 23 March.

Emphasis on Emigration Agreement

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Mar pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau)--It has been learned that in the course of Premier Turgut Ozal's and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vahit Halefoglu's trip to Moscow to attend the funeral of the President of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, they also participated in some important talks.

Ozal's and Halefoglu's first important meeting was with the Soviet premier, Tikhonov. During that meeting they dwelt in particular on the subject of natural gas to be obtained from the Soviet Union. On that occasion Turkish-Bulgarian relations, which are strained these days, were touched on "in a roundabout way." It was agreed to step up the work related to natural gas. It was decided to set up some committees in order to achieve positive results in the matter of natural gas.

However, the premier and the minister of foreign affairs stressed that the natural gas would also have to pass through Bulgaria to reach Turkey and mentioned the stance Sofia had adopted lately toward Turkey. They pointed out that in the face of it some worry and doubt might be felt about the natural gas reaching Turkey. At the same time, Ozal and Halefoglul also touched on the subject of "the situation of Turks in Bulgaria and Sofia's behavior."

Tikhonov adopted a stance showing that he could not see any problems as to natural gas reaching Turkey. However, he failed to respond to the Turkish premier's and the minister of foreign affairs' efforts to bring up the subject of Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

Since representatives of socialist nations were positioned apart from representatives of Western countries, the Bulgarian president, Todo Zhivkov, and Ozal and Halefoglul did not get close to each other. In fact an observer noted that Zhivkov affected to ignore the Turkish statesmen.

Meanwhile, a higher official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that no reply had been received to the second Turkish note that was sent to Sofia, and he added the following:

"Essentially, with the latest speech made by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Stanichev, Bulgaria disclosed the context of the answer Sofia will give to the second Turkish note. But the revision of the agreement on emigration between Turkey and Bulgaria was begun in 1964. And it was possible to complete it in 1968. We, taking all this into consideration, will make continuing efforts for the signing of an agreement on emigration between Turkey and Bulgaria. We don't believe that Bulgaria will raise any difficulties on the subject of natural gas."

At some point in the course of the funeral ceremony which took place in Red Square, Ozal and Halefoglul found the opportunity for an exchange with U.S.A. Vice-President George Bush and Secretary of State George Schultz in the section assigned to Western nations.

Both U. S. statesmen told Ozal that "they expected him in the United States and would be very gratified by his visiting Washington." At the same time, Vahit Halefoglul briefed the U.S. Secretary of State on the talks with the amir of Qatar, which will ensure the conveying of natural gas from there to the West via Turkey.

The U.S. Secretary of State said that they viewed positively "Turkey's efforts in connection with the conveying of natural gas from Qatar and Iran to the West," and that in fact they were in favor of the realization of this project.

The Canadian Premier, Brian Mulroney, expressed his distress to Ozal about the Armenian assault in Ottawa. The Canadian premier's words that a "bill on tighter measures against such raids" would be submitted to the Canadian Parliament were interpreted as a wish to allude to the insufficiency of the security measures that were taken in Ottawa.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

CHAIRMAN DOES NOT PERCEIVE TUSIAD AS PRESSURE GROUP

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 20 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association] chairman, Sahap Kocatopcu, and TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] chairman, Halit Narin, express different views on the subject of the "political activities" of the organizations they preside over.

The question of whether the TUSIAD was a "pressure group" always remained on the agenda as it published full page ads in the papers in past years, criticizing the government of those days and claiming that it took the wrong measures. And Ali Kocman, who was chairman of the TUSIAD for a long time, in the various interviews he gave the papers stressed that "If need be, the TUSIAD could be a political and economic pressure group.

The new chairman, Sahap Kocatopcu, who answered the questions of the UBA correspondent as to the "likelihood of the TUSIAD appearing on the nation's political agenda as a pressure group," spoke to the effect that: "Accepting the presidency of the TUSIAD means that one must abstain from airing views." Kocatopcu said the following:

"TUSIAD has become an organization which remains outside of politics and parties. It will always stay that way. It has to stay that way...Both now and in the past TUSIAD has always striven to stay out of politics. We, as an organization, favor no party. And I, as chairman, do not publicize my personal views by hiding behind TUSIAD's name. Let us suppose that only two or three parties were left in the nation. Would TUSIAD then favor one of those parties? No... We, beyond all forms of economic interest, have adopted the principle of giving precedence to national interests. We support an autonomous democracy and free enterprise."

12278
CSO: 3554/119

POLITICAL

TURKEY

TUSIAD, TISK VIEWS ON 'POLITICS' DIFFER

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 20 Mar 85 p 5

[Text] Kocatopcu: "We are outside of politics. I don't hide behind this organization to air my views."

Narin: "When necessary we intervene in politics. I can express views in the name of my organization or my own views at any time."

TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists' And Businessmen's Association] chairman, Sahap Kocatopcu, and TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] chairman, Halit Narin, expressed opposing views as to the weight of the organizations they preside over in Turkey's political structure.

Kocatopcu: "We favor no party."

Chairman Sahap Kocatopcu pointed out that TUSIAD should not appear on the nation's political agenda as a pressure group and said: "The TUSIAD has come to be an organization which remains outside of politics and parties, and it will always stay that way. We, as an organization, favor no party. And I myself, as president, do not hide behind the name of this organization to air my personal views... We follow the principle that, beyond all forms of economic interest, we give precedence to national interests. We are for an autonomous democracy and free enterprise."

Narin: "The gravy train can't run on words."

Chairman Halit Narin, who said he will not hesitate to express his views about conditions in the nation when necessary, also spoke to the effect that: "If need be, we might even make stern criticisms."

TISK chairman, Halit Narin, who said they were struggling to put the economy on the right track, continued as follows: "I am interested in results, not appearances. Economic measures can't be achieved with words. I'm fighting to bring some order to an economic structure with imports close to \$15 million and exports of \$40 to \$45 million. I can express at any time views in the name of my organization or my own views regarding the nation's political and economic situation."

POLITICAL

TURKEY

COMMISSION REENACTS OZDAGLAR 'BRIBERY INCIDENT'

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 14 Mar 85 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--Members of the Assembly commission formed to investigate charges of bribery against former Minister of State Ismail Ozdaglar reenacted the "bribery incident" on location on the basis of the information they have in their hands.

The commission members, who belong to various parties, this time played the "characters" of the bribery incident themselves. The participants in the reenactment of the bribery incident experienced the original excitement of the incident which allegedly took place on 24 December 1984.

The "reenactment of the bribery incident" progressed as follows:

Commission members Huseyin Avni Sagesen (Populist Party [PP], Ordu), Ayhan Sakalliolu (Motherland Party [MP], Sakarya) and Kadir Demir (Nationalist Democracy Party [NDP], Konya) arrived in front of the Grand Ankara Hotel in a Murat 131 automobile (license plate number 06 VA 197) owned by the Petroleum Office. The car was driven by Yasar Gungor, the chauffeur who drove the car on the actual date of the alleged incident.

The actual bribery car used on the day of the incident was driven yesterday by a policeman stationed in the Grand National Assembly. Riding in this car were commission members Mehmet Zeki Uzun (MP, Tokat) and Metin Ustunel (PP, Adana).

PP deputy Huseyin Avni Sagesen played the role of the briber, Ugur Mengenciolu. After emerging from Grand Ankara Hotel, Sagesen activated the tape recorder in his pocket. Sagesen, Sakalliolu and Demir, riding in the car driven by Yasar Gungor, "the driver of the bribery day", arrived in front of the Prime Ministry building.

Sagesen obtained an "entry card" from the security guard at the door and together with his colleagues went up to the Ministry of State offices. The present occupant of the ministry office, Mustafa Tinaz Titiz, left his room so that it could be used for the reenactment of the incident.

Ozdaglar's special secretary Tarhan Tekinel showed to the commission members where Menemenciolu and his colleagues had sat. On the basis of that testimony, Sagesen sat on a chair for a while. Later, the three men went into the minister's office as had happened on the day of the incident.

Kadir Demir played the role of Ozdaglar and sat at the minister's desk. MP deputy Mehmet Zeki Uzun impersonated Black Sea Copper Works Director General Dogan Cecen who was reportedly present in the room on the day of the incident.

The second person in the room, Konya deputy Ziya Ercan, was impersonated by Metin Ustunel.

After a short picture taking session with the journalists, the doors of the State Minister's office were closed. Sagesen, playing the role of Mengenecioglu, turned on the tape recorder in his pocket again. The "bribery conversation" was reenacted in accordance with a "script" prepared on the basis of witness testimonies.

The part of the reenactment in the Ministry of State took 26 minutes to complete.

Commission Given 2 More Months

The commission investigating allegations of "bribery and corruption" against Ozdaglar has been given a final extension of 2 months to complete the investigation. The commission chairman's request for a 2-month extension was read at the Assembly to inform the deputies.

There was no voting on the motion since the Constitution contains a provision with regard to this issue.

9588

CSO: 3554/110

POLITICAL

TURKEY

YESILTEPE CONSTRUCTION COOPERATIVE STRIKE ENDS

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 20 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] The strike which began on 1 March at the Yesiltepe Construction Cooperative in Ankara at the instigation of the Hizmet-Is trade union, a branch of Hak-Is, has been stopped. Following a petition from the employer, the Labor Court ruled on a "precautionary measure."

In the statement made by the chairman of the Hizmet-Is trade union, Huseyin Tanriverdi, to UBA he pointed out that the employer had appealed to the Labor Court on the excuse of general welfare and for a better winter, and said the following:

"As a matter of fact the employer should have appealed to the Council of Ministers on this matter. But he appealed to the Labor Court and his excuse was that inexperienced central heating workers lit central heating furnaces, and he claimed that this increased air pollution. Upon which the tribunal ruled a precautionary measure. If the court's ruling works against us we will resort to the Court of Appeal."

Tanriverdi said that they were not asking for excessive wages but a wage that would not exceed the monthly upkeep of the cats and dogs kept in the condominiums, adding "our working friends are not even valued as highly as animals. The people who live in those condominium apartments have an average monthly income of 150,000 to 250,000 Turkish liras. If each were to give an extra 1,000 Turkish liras, our workers' problems would be solved."

As is known, differences have arisen in the collective agreements between the Yesiltepe Construction Cooperative apartment owners' Board of Directors and the Hizmet-Is trade union, and the trade union has called for a strike by 26 workers on 1 March.

12278
CSO: 3554/119

MILITARY

FINLAND

CRUISE MISSILE REMAINS RETURNING TO USSR, DAMAGES ASKED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Apr 85 p 3

[Article: "Finland Surrenders Missile Remains, Compensation Wanted from USSR"]

[Text] Finland will return the remains of the Soviet target missile raised from Lake Inari to the Soviet Union. At the same time, Finland is demanding that the Soviet Union cover the direct expenditures incurred from the salvaging of the remains. President Mauno Koivisto and the leadership of the Foreign Ministry made a decision on this matter in the name of the government on Tuesday evening.

The Foreign Ministry reported the decision to return the remains immediately to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, which asked for the return of the missile parts last Friday. The missile remains will be returned at the end of this week.

According to the Foreign Ministry, a proposal regarding compensation was made to the Soviet Union on Tuesday with respect to "those direct costs which were incurred by Finland in connection with the salvaging of the missile remains".

The ministry would not say how much compensation Finland wants. Most likely, the costs have not yet been calculated. There have been two different views on compensation in the Foreign Ministry. In the opinion of some, Finland should demand compensation for both the search phase well as the retrieval of the parts. In the opinion of others, it is only justifiable to ask compensation for retrieval expenses. The wording of the communique points to the latter solution.

Extra costs were incurred for Finland primarily from overtime work and helicopters. A helicopter flown from Uti and 15--20 men participated in the retrieval of the missile.

The missile's parts are now being studied at the Air Force's depot in Tampere. From there they will be transported possibly by train to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union paid 400,000 markkaa in compensation for resolution of an aircraft hijacking in the summer of 1977. Nearly 500 men participated in this effort. At that time the clarification of compensation took more than 6 months.

MILITARY

FINLAND

AIR RAID SHELTER GOALS SET IN 1983 REMAIN UNMET

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 15 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Colonel Gunnar Ohman, staff adviser: "Population Shelters Should Not Be Politicized"]

[Text] The results of the work of Parliamentary Civil Defense Committee, which completed its work in the early spring of 1983, have not yet been heard. According to the report, the state was supposed to invest 60 million and the local municipalities approximately 110 million in civil defense by 1985, for example. It is already public knowledge that these proposals have not been accomplished.

On the other hand, progress is being made in the area of legislation, with which there is reason to be satisfied. The statute on a civil defense council and civil defense training concerning all citizens as well as the obligations of owners of individual buildings to provide shelters represent an important watershed in this legislation.

The legislative section is proposing a civil defense council in place of a civil defense advisory committee. The reason mentioned is that civil defense concerns all of society so that a council representing the political power relationships in parliament would be expedient.

An advisory committee made up of experts representing various interest groups has worked for nearly 20 years and has accomplished significant improvements in the area of civil defense. This a rather flimsy argument for politicizing the committee now.

An Alarming Example

The National Defense Planning Committee was politicized over a period of time. It is appropriate to ask how effective its successor, the National Defense Information Planning Committee, has been.

In those countries in which civil defense is given real value, the members of a council are influential individuals such as ministers, directors of central government offices, staff secretaries, and so on. The opinion of the defense council, in particular, should have been heard in the matter of a council.

The proposal that a municipal leader under the jurisdiction of a municipal government or someone else appointed by a municipal government and an official of the central government be responsible as a civil defense director is a rather correct solution.

On the other hand, that indefiniteness as to which board and which individual in a municipality will take care of civil defense matters is left to a rather loose and undefined deliberation of the municipalities.

Thus last spring in Jyvaskyla Interior Minister Luttinen interpreted this to mean that all the municipalities can refrain from appointing a civil defense board as well as a civil defense chief and leave civil defense matters to the fire departments.

With this kind of thinking and interpretation the most important task of civil defense is forgotten, in other words, operations in exceptional situations as well as in a state of war.

Protection Against Gas Forgotten

The paragraphs concerning a structural civil defense have been correctly compiled. The obligation to build public shelters of varying degree in connection with new construction throughout the whole country will do much to promote readiness.

The obligation to build a shelter in a building with at least 1000 m² of floor space or in a building in which there are at least 8 units or 30 people will prevent attempts to get around the construction obligation in the future.

The regulations concerning rural areas have not been implemented. The draft legislation contains only a mention that "the protection of farm production by structural measures will be regulated separately".

In addition, protection against gas has been completely ignored.

Public participation in training would continue to be voluntary. Its implementation would remain a matter of the municipality. This will mean that no improvements worth mentioning will occur in this matter.

Paragraph 8 of the civil defense act could have been made more precise since the wording "the Interior Ministry can turn the accomplishment of certain civil defense tasks over to voluntary organizations" is rather general.

The legislative section has treated civil defense primarily under normal conditions. Therefore, the state's role has been given very little attention. Thus security policy aspects have not been considered and what circumstance should be considered as a serious shortage. Also issues connected with readiness legislation have not been considered.

The Parliamentary Civil Defense Committee has established the increase of the state's contribution as a necessary condition. This change in the law will not exactly bring an improvement to the matter since the problems of normal times were emphasized while leaving the demands of exceptional conditions in the background.

29 April 1985

MILITARY

FINLAND

AIR FORCE BUYING DRAGEN PARTS, EQUIPMENT FROM SWEDEN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Mar 85 p 12

[Article: "Air Force Gets 107 Million Markkaa for Draken Spare Parts"]

[Text] The Air Force is procuring approximately 107 million markkaa worth of spare parts and equipment from used Draken fighter planes in Sweden. On Thursday the Council of State gave the Air Force the right to conclude this transaction with the Swedish Forsvarets Materialverkin.

The procurement is part of an agreement concluded in March of last year, by which Finland ordered used Draken aircraft from the same institution for the purpose of making air surveillance more effective in Southwest Finland. Some of the aircraft were also used to replace obsolete equipment in the Lapland Flight Detachment. The number and cost of the fighter planes has not been disclosed, but a procurement authority for 195 million markkaa was granted for this purpose in last year's budget.

The procurement of spare parts and equipment includes a compensation condition in the manner of the actual fighter aircraft deal, according to which the seller will attempt to make counterpurchases from Finland in an amount corresponding to the value of this procurement.

This procurement of spare parts and equipment is based on a procurement authority granted in this year's budget. The authority concerns the procurement of necessary aircraft equipment, accessories, and support systems because of new aircraft being put into use.

10576

CSO: 3617/99

MILITARY

FINLAND

PAPER COMMENTS ON DEFENSE CREDIBILITY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "A Small But More Effective Army"]

[Text] Reference has been made to increasing the credibility of our defense in improving the Army's combat equipment. This point of view should not be underestimated, the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact, which is marking its anniversary, obligates us to do this.

The level of equipment is considered to be in a direct relationship with official national defense readiness. If the defense forces are not equipped in such a way that the defenders are provided with reasonable opportunities for accomplishing the tasks assigned to them, then official defense readiness becomes questionable at least in the view of outsiders. Indeed, no one can under present conditions and at the present time be blind with respect to the absolute necessity of a defense capability. Unfortunately, it is not possible to depend on humane idealism in the search for peace, but on historical realism.

But considered from a national point of view, another viewpoint is worthy of the one already mentioned in this connection. Old pictures of Finnish troops moving around on tractors, bicycles, and even horses gave an alarmingly defenseless image of the capabilities of our soldiers to judicious Finns also. Indeed, even after the protective forces of the ground forces or at least a portion of them have been provided with modern transport equipment, the majority of the troops placed on mobilization has to resort to the use of various civilian vehicles. The situation is reminiscent of Cajander's times nearly 50 years ago.

The matter of increasing the trust and faith of the fathers and mothers of Finnish conscripts in the capability of our Army to carry out its tasks is in any event an issue comparable with outside obligations. Indeed, it should always be subjected to the scrutiny of the views and demands of others.

In a small Finnish society we have become accustomed to placing quality before quantity to an ever increasing degree. But the defense forces, on the contrary, always emphasize the importance of a large number of trained reservists. Visible numbers, of course, have their own significance. Since, on the

one hand, the time served by conscripts is rather short and even a significant portion of it is spent idly prior to being discharged, the stamp of quality is not unconditionally convincing.

But even a small country must in any case maintain its defense forces. Then it is in the interest of everyone -- pacifists as well as others -- that meager appropriations be used correctly. This trend is generally supported by the determination of tasks assigned to our defense forces and our resources. Society must ensure the security of its young men.

10576

CSO: 3617/100

MILITARY

FINLAND

PARTIES' MANEUVERING OVER DEFENSE COMMISSION CONTINUING

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Apr 85 p 7

[Article: "Defense Commission Issue Still Undecided"]

[Text] The establishment of a parliamentary defense policy planning commission ran into yet another obstacle on Wednesday when the Social Democrats requested that the issue be tabled in the government's Financial Affairs Committee.

A solution and a list of names of the commission members were already forthcoming at the Wednesday session of the government after many complications. Matti Tuovinen (Center Party member), who is just about to retire from the position of state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, was named as chairman of the commission and MP Pekka Myllyniemi (Social Democrat) was named as vice-chairman.

The members of the commission will be MP and Party Secretary Erkki Liikanen (Social Democrat), Conservative Party Vice-Chairman Tapani Miettinen, MP Veikko Vennamo (Finnish Rural Party member), Party Secretary Peter Stenlund (Swedish People's Party member), and former General Secretary Jorma Henttila of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. The power relationships in the commission are 4 to 3 in favor of the non-Socialists.

The Christians, Constitutionals, and the Greens did not get any representation in the commission. The SKP [Finnish Communist Party] minority, for its part, lost the vice-chairmanship it has held in previous parliamentary defense commissions.

The commission's task will be to issue statements on development plans in the administrative area of the Defense Ministry and if necessary also in other sectors of national defense.

Originally, Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki (Center Party member) proposed the formation of a parliamentary committee again, but the proposal failed due to opposition from the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats did not want that interpretations of the obligations of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation,

and Mutual Aid] Pact would be made in the committee in the manner of previous committees.

It was also requested at Wednesday's session of the Financial Affairs Committee that the bill concerning tax relief for investment accounts as well as the tax relief petitions of certain charitable associations be tabled.

10576

CSO: 3617/100

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ARMY LACKS LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES--Secretary of State for Defense Figueiredo Lopes stated yesterday that "in case of conflict the response capability of the Portuguese armed forces would be limited by the lack of logistic support." The statement was made on the occasion of the visit to Portugal by a NATO subcommittee for cooperation in the field of defense. "In case of conflict, the Portuguese forces integrated in NATO ought to play an important role. However, their capability to sustain prolonged operations would be seriously compromised because of the lack of logistic support," Figueiredo Lopes stated, adding that "it is increasingly difficult to obtain defense equipment, given the fact that this requires economic assistance that is not always available." [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 2 Apr 85 p 4]

CSO: 3542/158

MILITARY

SWEDEN

PAPER ON CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING RECRUIT TRAINING CHANGES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Supreme Commander Saves the Regiment"]

[Text] Everyone knows that there will be 5-6000 fewer 19-year-olds in the age groups that will undergo basic military training in the next few years. Logically this would suggest that an equal number of training openings, the equivalent of five or six army units, will have to be cut. There is a shortage of funds in the armed forces for the purchase of materiel and rationalization opportunities cannot be ignored.

At the same time--as a result of an intensified security policy situation--there is a need to increase the defense system's incident preparedness in peacetime. The events in Karlskrona showed that this can involve protracted and comprehensive emergency tasks that must be taken care of by recruits who are in the process of being trained.

The Committee on Training Recruits, VK 1983, tried to meet both these requirements by outlining a system of so-called rotating training. The idea is that one army unit could train three lots of recruits in a 2-year period with a training period of around 7 months. In this way VK 1983 felt that the army would not only be able to reduce the number of training openings and have access to trained recruits for emergencies during a large part of the year--it would also be able with a certain number of recruits to phase out our third peacetime unit south of the Dal River.

The army chief, who strongly objected to the proposals made by VK 1983, said that the consequences of such a drastic change would be negative for both officers and recruits. He also felt that mobilization readiness would be poorer and that the savings realized through rotating training would be more than offset by increased costs for such things as travel and materiel.

As an alternative the head of the army proposed that different types of unit be coordinated so that an artillery regiment could be joined with a tank regiment, for example. The idea is that the recruit training of the two forces could alternate: 1 year artillery, the other tanks, etc. He outlined this kind of coordination in three different locations: Kristianstad, Eksjö

and the Stockholm region (Kungsängen/Norrtälje), the last of which would be more like a relocation due to the distance involved.

Both of the alternatives involve problems for those who have to make the decision. Rotating training along the lines suggested by VK 1983 is interesting but hard to win support for. The army chief's proposal does not entirely meet the demands for economy and preparedness but on the other hand it is easier to carry out. That seems to be what the supreme commander had in mind when he told the government Friday that he supported continued study of unit coordination but opposed a more detailed investigation of the implications of rotating training.

In his own words the supreme commander's stand is based on "a very preliminary evaluation." However he claimed that rotating training would detract from mobilization security, reduce flexibility in the training system and would at the same time be more expensive than the army chief's unit coordination proposal.

The supreme commander's arguments are actually directed against any elimination of peacetime units. The question is whether the government can accept that when there is such an obvious need for cuts there. It would be better to have some outsider, such as the Defense Committee or the Armed Forces Rationalization Institute, study both alternatives and perhaps consider the possibility of combining parts of each proposal.

6578

CSO: 3650/222

MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

GROUP CALLS FOR ABOLITION OF ARMY, MORAL NATIONAL DEFENSE

DW010735 Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 29 Mar 85 p 26

[Article by K.A.: "Deterrence Through 'Moral Tanks'?"]

[Text] The "people's initiative for a Switzerland without an army and for a comprehensive peace policy" which has been promoted for some time by the "Group Switzerland Without Army" (GSOA) materially aims at the unilateral renunciation of military national defense, and politically at the reactivation and radicalization of the stagnating peace movement in the struggle against the army which is called a "myth." At a meeting organized by the GSOA in Zurich, the initiators once again confirmed the option of withdrawing their demand prior to the referendum if too disastrous a defeat were to be expected as a result of a Russian intervention in Poland, for instance. In the tactical calculation of Andreas Gross, the political main promoter of the people's initiative, this option will not have a counterproductive effect on the chances of other concerns and topics of the peace movement which is divided over the army issue (regarding arms sites, the referendum on armament, and civilian substitute service): He thinks that the readiness of the opponents, meaning the majority which is for the army, to make concessions in these areas will grow when military national defense is attacked.

Restructuring of Society

The real topic of the meeting was the alternative to the army and its peace-keeping functions, which so far have not been explained concretely by the GSOA. In this respect, Gross and Roman Brodmann, the "spiritual father" of the initiative and member of the launching committee, provided the gathering of GSOA activists and followers with some suggestions and ideas in support of argumentation. Thereby they gave a foretaste of the way in which the GSOA will justify the abolition of the army and defend the antagonism between security and peace policy, in the forthcoming discussions.

The negation of something negative was already positive enough in itself, Gross said, but the GSOA also could not avoid the "Helvetian Principle" of constructive criticism, which was described as "dangerous." In his view the army is useless and dangerous because it creates hotbeds of conflict and settles them militarily. Given the risks of a nuclear escalation between the blocs, this was irresponsible, he noted. There were no realistic

arguments for a (conventional) war between just two states in Europe. According to Gross, a "comprehensive peace policy" to which Switzerland must be committed according to a proposal of the initiative, is aimed at the egalitarian and ecological restructuring of the Swiss society which today still needs an army, and at fighting the economic and intellectual roots of support for the army.

Moral National Defense

In an aggressive note Brodmann advocated the abolition of the army as the total response to the total arrogance of the powerful, who so far had only inflicted defeats on the peace movement's reform strategy. With reference to his booklet "Switzerland Without Army" published as early as 1973, the Swiss journalist, who formerly worked in Germany, urged a radical change from a military to a moral national defense. Switzerland could return to its tradition as a country offering its good services and mediating in conflicts and only has to upgrade the role which the international community had attributed to it for a long time, he said. Brodmann mentioned as elements of a Swiss "moral tank" the setting up of a world university open to all, of an emergency corps (which, by the way, has existed since 1974), and the development of the country as a turntable for mediating in international conflicts. In return, Switzerland could expect the contractual recognition and guarantee of its independence and territorial sovereignty. Together with total disarmament, such services and concessions would raise the threshold of moral restraint of a possible attacker--in other words, they would have a dissuasive effect--and would bring Switzerland additional friends, he said. Even Hitler had spared our country--had not occupied it, as he had planned to do--not because of its army, but for moral and pragmatic reasons.

CSO: 3620/335

ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

BRIEFS

FIRST FRESH FISH EXPORTS--The exportation of fresh fish is now underway in Greenland, with the first shipments being sent out of the country today, Thursday, to Montreal and Ottawa, Canada. Shrimp, scallops and halibut will be sent by direct flight from Nuuk to Frobisher Bay and from there directly to the abovenamed cities. Three tons of fresh fish are being sent to begin with; the size of future shipments will depend upon the success of this one. Not long ago the Royal Greenland Company sent unfrozen shelled shrimp by airplane from Jakoshavn in northwest Greenland to Copenhagen. These shrimp appeared in the stores within 24 hours after they had been shelled. This attempt was judged to be highly successful, since all of the big Greenlandic shrimp were sold out almost immediately. [Text] [Article by N. J. Bruun] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 18 Feb 85 p 22] 9584

CSO: 3626/15

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

INDUSTRY OVER RELIANT ON USSR FOR ARCTIC PROJECT CONTRACTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Apr 85 p 27

[Commentary by Heikki Arola]

[Text] Even Finnish firms have been overcome by Arctic hysteria. The exploitation of northern Arctic areas will in the next few decades become a major undertaking, on which many businesses are banking their future. However, the expectations of many are not guaranteed and are unrealistic and development has not been as rapid as was imagined.

An unrealistically extensive product selection, a lack of cooperation between firms, excessive concentration on only the Soviet markets, and a neglect of Western markets.

Therein lie the worst mistakes of Finnish firms in talking about Arctic area ventures in the opinion of Professor Pauli Jumpanen. Jumpanen is to some degree an expert since he directs the Arctic technological project in VTT [State Technical Research Center], which is in close contact with the nation's industry.

Jumpanen contends that the criticism is hard, but denies that it contains any accusations: "As director of the project I consider that I have a responsibility for these words."

Within a period of a couple years VTT has become familiar with 30 Finnish firms and their products in order to determine what improvements should be made.

In Jumpanen's opinion, the first and most decisive error of the Finns is the assumption of unrealistic expectations in the development of Soviet markets. All signs point to the fact that a construction boom era in the Arctic areas of the Soviet Union is still rather far off, which is a result of the fact that there have been no significant oil discoveries in a long time. There are deposits of gas, but at present prices it is not worthwhile to begin producing gas in these areas.

Another reason for the slow development of Eastern markets involves commercial policy. Bilateral trade is by its nature slow moving and the accommodation of

large Arctic deliveries within its framework can be painfully difficult. One way of getting around this obstacle is to join forces with Western firms and conglomerates, but even this will not succeed without years of thorough cooperation.

Toward The West

Thus, in Jumppanen's opinion, Finnish firms have several reasons to turn their attention away from the Soviet Union toward the West. At least half of the projects in Arctic markets should be directed to Western countries according to Jumppanen's assessment if the firms intend to even come close achieving the figures at which they are aiming.

An attempt should be made to enter the Western markets, the North Sea, Alaska, and Canada not only for their own sake, but also to acquire competitive ability with respect to the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union's markets begin to open up sometime in the 1990s, all the major Western suppliers will be breaking their necks to get their share of these markets. Then the only decisive factor will be raw competitive ability.

One problem is funding, which is beginning to be more and more decisive in these large projects and frequently it is beginning to be a more important factor than technical competitive ability according to Jumppanen's understanding. As a small country Finland is on a weak foundation in the face of this kind of a trend.

Compensation deals are becoming more prevalent, in other words, payment for deliveries is obtained in the form of products, and for individual firms the procedure is inconvenient. As a solution for the Finns Jumppanen proposes groupings of firms, which should include exporters as well as consumers of the products received as payment. This does not necessarily always mean the participation of Neste -- at least not when it is a question of something else other than energy.

Only A Small Factor

The present Arctic off-shore product selection of Finnish firms, or a projected product selection, is too extensive in Jumppanen's opinion. The Finns can be only a small factor in the northern markets at best, and, therefore, those specialized areas on which they can concentrate should be carefully selected.

Jumppanen points out that Arctic construction is to be accomplished by a modular system, by joining large sections together, in which the structures, instruments, and processing equipment are already installed. When the pieces are erected, the plant can be put into operation.

The principle of the construction of modules is the same as on ships and drilling platforms, not dependent on a manufacturing site. They can be made anywhere in the world. Only a worldwide competitive ability will be decisive, and, therefore, specialization should be resolved in good time and based on our own technological base.

The products must also include more high-tech components, automation, satellite techniques, electronics, and underwater technology since there will be a development toward more difficult conditions in prospecting and production. That portion of the technology which has not been mastered in Finland must be imported, but basic skills must be mastered at that time.

There is also too much overlapping in Finnish firms in Jumppanen's opinion, and cooperation is lacking at home as well as abroad. A healthy development is taking place with respect to the shipyards: cooperating firms have been found at least from the Nordic countries and even all the way from the United States.

The difficulty of the Western markets is their protectionism. Norway and the United States continue to protect territories with vigilance and the only effective means of breaking into them is cooperation with local firms. Thus such a Western trend has begun.

Northern geographical sites, except for perhaps Norway and the Barents Sea, are not of much benefit to Finland. As far as sea transport is concerned, the Central European countries, for example, are in a better position. Finland can benefit more from sub-Arctic conditions, which have taught them about ice-breaking technology, among other things.

Jumppanen hopes the firms of different areas will find each other in Finland. He would consider a combination of shipyards, construction firms, and electronics enterprises to be ideal. For example, he considers greater participation by Nokia as desirable.

Construction firms are already seeking cooperation. The large construction firms, Finn-Stroi and Partek as well as Lohja, have together established the Arctic Construction Group.

10576

CSO: 3617/100

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASED 25 PERCENT In 1984

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Jan 85 p 12

[Text] Unemployment throughout all of last year involved some 1.3 percent of the anticipated work force on the labor market. This figure is 0.7 percent lower than what was estimated by the National Economic Board at the beginning of last year. Unemployment was recorded in December as amounting to 40,000 work days, which is equivalent to 1,900 persons being without work for the entire month.

Unemployment was recorded for all of last year as amounting to 385,000 work days for the entire country, which is equivalent to 1,500 persons being on the unemployment rolls throughout the year. This figure, representing work days of unemployment, increased in 1984 by 76,000, or 25 percent, compared with 1983. Unemployment figures by percent increased from one percent to 1.3 percent. In the monthly report on unemployment from the labor Office of the Ministry of Social Affairs, it says, among other things, that the recorded unemployment increased substantially in the latter part of December because of the slowdown in fish processing throughout the country. This will also be apparent in the figures from January.

9584

CSO: 3626/15

JPRS-WER-85-043
29 April 1985

GNP DECLINE REVERSED IN 1984

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 20 Mar 85 p 64

[Article: "New National Economic Institute Report: Recessionary Period in Icelandic Economy Ended 1984--GNP Increased by 2½ Percent"]

[Text] It is estimated that the GNP of Iceland increased by 2½ percent during 1984, but last October the National Economic Institute's forecast indicated a 1.2-percent reduction in the GNP during 1984. The forecast now is that the GNP will increase by 1 percent this year. In a new National Economic Institute report on the development of economic affairs it is stated that it is clear that the recession period of the GNP that began in 1982 ended last year.

Increased export production in 1984 is the main explanation for the increase in the GNP by 2½ percent, but the total increase in the export production was slightly less than 12 percent of real value. Production of marine products increased by 11 percent; aluminum by 5½ percent; ferrosilicon by 22 percent and other industrial products by 21 percent.

Despite this increase in exports in 1984 and a forecast of an increase in 1985, the foreign trade deficit is still great. That can especially be traced to great imports in 1984 and a heavy foreign credit burden. The first figures indicate that the trade deficit was 4.1 billion kronur in 1984, or about 6 percent of the GNP. Last October, the forecast was 5 percent. The forecast now is that the deficit will not be much below 6 percent in 1985, but the estimate of the deficit was 4.5 percent in the forecast last October. "Trade deficit along with inflation are the most difficult economic matters facing Icelanders," states the report from the National Economic Institute.

The annual rate of inflation had leveled off to 15 percent before the wage negotiations and the devaluation in November. At that time, the inflation jumped greatly but despite that, the average price increases from 1983 to 1984 are less than any year before 1983, i.e. 29 percent. The outlook is that around the middle of this year, price changes will have reached a 15-20 percent annual rate. "After the middle of the year, there is greater uncertainty in price affairs," says the National Economic Institute, "especially because of the uncertainty about wage agreements most of which can

be terminated as of 1 September this year, although they are officially valid until the end of the year."

In 1984 the national expenditure for consumption and investments increased by slightly over 3 percent. Unemployment seemed to be similar in 1984 to what it was in 1983, or slightly over 1 percent of the available manpower. In the beginning of 1985, fewer people were registered unemployed than during the same period of last 2 years.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

JPRS-WIR-85-043
29 April 1985

PAPER COMMENTS ON INSTITUTE REPORT SHOWING ECONOMIC GROWTH

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Mar 85 p 32

[Editorial: "Is the Recession Period Over?"]

[Text] "It is therefore clear that the recession period that began in 1982 ended last year, that is 1984," states a news release from the National Economic Institute to the mass media the day before yesterday.

This is good news if it continues but many unknown factors characterize the Icelandic economy at present.

The forecast of the National Economic Institute for 1984 indicated a slight reduction in the production of marine products but an overall unchanged export production from 1983. This did not come to pass. There was an increase by 11 percent in the production of marine products and an overall increase by 12 percent in the value of export production. The overall export did not increase as much as the production, or only about 3 percent, as a considerable quantity of the inventory of export goods was sold in 1983. Last year, the production of aluminum increased by 5.5 percent; production of ferro-silicon by 22 percent and other industrial goods by 21 percent.

The National Economic Institute considers the main explanation for the overall GNP increase of 2.5 percent in 1984 to be the ease of authorizing fishing permits based on marine research that showed more favorable results than earlier research. The capelin proved to be extremely plentiful in the last months of last year and cod and shrimp exceeded the estimate considerably. Whether this continues is uncertain. The fish catch is unstable. But the National Economic Institute forecasts 1 percent growth in the 1985 GNP.

Domestic demand increased considerably last year, also contrary to the National Economic Institute's earlier forecast. National expenditure for consumption and investment increased by 3 percent. At that point in the National Economic Institute's news release there is the statement that the recession period of the past years is now ended.

Employment is fairly stable overall, despite localized unemployment in certain areas, and the overall unemployment is only 1 percent of the total working age population. That would be considered good news in most industrial

countries in the world. There were fewer people registered unemployed in the beginning of 1985 than during the last 2 years.

Despite some growth in the GNP, there was a 4.1 billion kronur foreign trade deficit, or 6 percent of the GNP, according to the National Economic Institute's news release. Forecasts call for a slightly lower trade deficit in 1985. This is primarily caused by two factors: great increase in domestic demand, i.e. imports, and heavy foreign credit burden.

The inflation decreased considerably in the closing months of 1983 and into the fall of 1984. At that time, price changes calculated at an annual rate had gone down to 15 percent. In the wake of new wage agreements and devaluation last year, the inflation jumped. The average price increase between 1983 and 1984 was, however, only 29 percent, or less than at any time since 1973. With everything unchanged, the outlook seems to be that in the middle of this year the price changes will have subsided to similar levels to what they were before the wage negotiations last fall, i.e. to 15-20 percent annual rate. However, uncertainty prevails in the wage agreements, i.e. it is difficult to predict the future as most of them are revokable as of 1 September this year, although they are officially valid until the end of the year. The inflation for 1985 is in the hands of the leaders of the influential powers in the society.

Trade deficit and inflation are Iceland's greatest economic difficulties. If we can get a grip on these two problems and revitalize industrial life, we will cultivate the national field for a bountiful harvest. If this same national field, however, becomes a battlefield for trade unions, as disruptive powers hope, we will continue to remain in the doldrums of a poor standard of living, along with the other nations in which strikes are used excessively as weapons.

As for the question of whether the recession period is ended, we will answer that ourselves through actions in the coming months.

9583

CSO: 3626/26

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

IMF SEEN AS TRYING TO RESTRICT ECONOMIC GROWTH

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Mar 85 pp 1,8

["From Ankara" column by Yalcin Dogan: "It is Hard to Satisfy the IMF"]

[Text] Ankara--Talks between Turkey and the IMF are progressing under very difficult conditions. The agreement signed with the IMF immediately after the announcement of the 24 January decisions which shook the Turkish economic system at its foundations 5 years ago was perhaps "the most easily signed accord" in Turkish economic history. While the agreement that led to profound changes was so easily signed, 5 years later it has become very hard for the Ozal government to reach an accord with the IMF. It has in fact become so hard that the talks have been cut.

The budget deficit and the government's failure to bring inflation under control are not the result of the "economic practices of 1983" as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Deputy Prime Minister Kaya Erdem frequently claim. At least the IMF does not think so--even though the agreement signed with the Ozal government last year contains critical references to the economic practices of 1983. But that has not stopped the IMF from saying: "Instead of criticizing 1983, tell us what you are doing now." When the bargaining gets tough, the talks reach a breaking point. It should be pointed out that "the cut in talks" does not mean "no agreement." An accord may still be reached, but the remedy that will be prescribed for the country's economic disease may be one of the "bitterest medicines" of the last 5 years.

One may look at past experience and ask: "Can there be even more bitter medicine?" The condition of broad social segments and the working class clearly manifests who carried the burdens of the last five years. Now it is desired to extend the economic practices of the last five years into 1985. For example, the wage increases offered in collective agreements for public sector workers are based on a decision taken all the way back in August 1984. A decision of principle announced by the Public Collective Labor Agreements Coordination Council of the Prime Minister's Office on 4 August 1984 says: "Wage increases will rise by 30 percent the first year and will not exceed 25 percent the second year. Efforts will be made to keep them lower than these figures."

A decision taken in August 1984 is made to apply in 1985. In fact, public corporations have endorsed the rule of "trying to keep them lower" and have

prepared proposals to that effect. For example, the Corporation for Machine and Chemical Industries has proposed to increase wages by 21 to 24 percent in 1985.

A recent survey conducted by the Turkish Confederation of Labor, on the other hand, shows that the average price of the 51 foodstuffs used to compute the minimum wage rose by 61 percent in the last 12 months. Thus the average price of foodstuffs most commonly consumed by low-income families, such as dry beans, chickpeas, lentils, rice, shortening and bulgur, has risen by 61 percent. In contrast to this 61 percent rise in food prices, which does not include price hikes in bus fares and coal gas, the Ozal government is offering workers wage hikes of 21 to 24 percent. At a time when it has been confirmed that prices rose by 12 percent in the first two months of the year, workers are being offered, for the entire year, wage increases that were recommended last August.

Despite all this, "it is still very hard to satisfy the IMF." Ozal and the IMF have concurred on limiting wage increases. But the IMF also wants "a smaller Turkey." While Turkey wants "to grow" using all its strength and potential, the IMF is telling us "to shrink." To that end, Turkey is being asked to sustain a lower growth rate, to devalue its currency more rapidly and to appropriate less of its national product to investments. Having succeeded in its drive to limit wage increases, the IMF is now asking for a "shrinking Turkey."

In announcing the 24 January 1980 decisions which led to radical changes in the economy, Ozal was able to say "yes" to virtually everything. Because then he was a technician. Now he is far beyond the technician stage and is in a position to make "political decisions." He has political responsibilities. Eventually, the IMF will most likely sign another agreement with Turkey. But what is worrying Ozal is the "political ramifications of this affair."

9588

CSO: 3554/109

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

STATISTICS ON MINING SECTOR PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS

1985 Program Set for Mining

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Feb 85 (Supl) p 1

[Text] The 1985 annual program for the mining sector calls for 408 billion liras in production, 84 billion liras in exports and the equivalent of 86 billion liras in imports, all at 1984 prices. The biggest share in mineral products exports goes to boron salts at 43 billion liras. Other important items in exports are chromium at 12 billion liras and magnesite at 11 billion liras. Coal heads the list of mineral product imports to meet Turkey's domestic consumption. The 1985 program calls for imports of 28 billion liras in anthracite and 14 billion liras in lignite. Another important import is phosphate at 16 billion liras.

Domestic demand for the mining sector, excluding crude oil and natural gas, in 1985 is set at 424.472 billion liras at 1984 prices. Of the domestic production projected at a worth of 408.677 billion liras, coal mining will account for 241.695 billion liras. The 1985 program calls for production of 29,320,000 tons of lignite, 3,650,000 tons of anthracite and 820,000 tons of asphaltite. Thus, 1985 production is expected to increase in comparison with 1984 23.4 percent in lignite, 1.4 percent in anthracite and 7.9 percent in asphaltite.

Iron ore production, programmed to rise 2.2 percent this year, will be 3,810,000 tons, worth 16.192 billion liras.

An increase of 0.4 percent is expected in metal production, set at a worth of 16.557 billion liras in the 1985 program. Production increases are projected at 6.5 percent in copper and copper pyrite, 19.8 percent in mercury, 4.1 percent in manganese, 66.7 percent in diasporite and 8.6 percent in leaded zinc. Production of these minerals for 1985 is set at 2,060,000 tons of copper, 50,500 tons of mercury, 70,000 tons of ferromanganese, 2,000 tons of diasporite and 190,000 tons of leaded zinc. Production of other metals includes 27,300 tons of antimony, 160,000 tons of bauxite, 490,000 tons of chromium, 27,000 tons of manganese, 112,000 tons of molybdenum, 43,500 tons of zinc oxide and 150,000 tons of wolfram.

Enriched ore production is estimated at a worth of around 59.918 billion liras. Production of enriched ores is expected to register a rise of 7.5 percent over 1984. The largest portion of enriched ore production will consist of 3,420,000 tons of sinter iron worth 35.4 billion liras. Sinter iron production is expected

to rise 10 percent. Expected production of other enriched ores is 62,000 tons of alumina at 8.8 billion liras, 120,000 tons of concentrated copper at 7.5 billion liras and 55,000 tons of concentrated zinc at 2.5 billion liras. Production figures for still other enriched ores are set at 52,000 tons of concentrated chromium, 2,700 tons of concentrated lead, 2,000 tons of concentrated manganese, 71,000 tons of concentrated pyrite, 420,000 tons of concentrated diatomaceous silica and 101,000 tons of sinter magnesite.

The production program for nonmetallic minerals calls for 4,568,000 tons, or 55.2 billion liras. The largest share of nonmetallic minerals production goes to boron salts at 790,000 tons, or 36.1 billion liras. Other minerals are 260,000 tons of barite at 3.2 billion liras, 1,435,000 tons of salt at 4.7 billion liras and 80,000 tons of strontium carbonate at 2.1 billion liras.

Quarry stone and construction materials are set at 148 million tons, or 79 billion liras. Of this, 26 billion liras will come from sand, gravel and crushed rock, 16 billion liras from limestone, 10 billion liras from cut stone and 9 billion liras from marble.

Turkey exports a large portion of its surplus mining products. The program calls for the export of 51 percent of boron salts produced, 14.1 percent of chromium ore and 13 percent of magnesite. Exports of mineral products are expected to rise 6.3 percent in 1985.

The largest amount imported in mineral products in which domestic production does not meet consumption will be anthracite, at 33 percent in 1985. In mineral imports in 1985, phosphate will take second place at 18 percent, lignite will take third place with 16.2 percent and concentrated copper and asbestos will be in fourth and fifth place with 4.2 percent and 4.1 percent respectively.

In order to meet program goals, it was decided to place priority on bringing primary energy sources on line and stepping up the completion and expansion of existing technical operations projects.

The program calls for "research of the mining machinery industry" to determine the potential for mechanized mining in Turkey and for a "Long-Term Mineral Exploration Project" to be drawn up by the Mining Research Institute for completion in 1985. This is to include a stepped-up effort to procure raw materials needed for nuclear energy, bringing geothermal energy sources on line and locating natural gas deposits. The program also contains provisions for salt to come under the Mining Law and for copper deposits belonging to the public sector to be combined under the Black Sea Copper Works Corporation. Neither program measure, however, goes beyond the expressed desire at the moment.

Mineral Exports Up in 1984

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Feb 85 (Supl) pp 1, 7

[Text] Turkey's mineral exports season closed with a total of \$270,883,000. This income acquired in 1984 expresses a 24.6-percent rise in value over 1 year earlier. In 1983, Turkey had total [mineral] exports of \$217,309,000.

While the value of exports rose 24.5 [as published] percent, there was a drop in the prices of many types of minerals, and the increase in income is lower than the increase in quantity of minerals exported. Despite the continued rise in exports in various types of marble, where rapid increase has been seen in recent years, the extraordinary downturn in prices continued. While the amount of smooth marble exported rose to 20,819 tons in 1984, 110 percent higher than the previous year, the foreign exchange earned fell from \$1.415 million the previous year to \$918,000. Income for all marble exports fell back from \$5,969,000 in 1983 to \$4,726,000, a full 26-percent decline in export revenues.

While export revenues declined and the prices of minerals Turkey exports suffered a reversal on world markets, the amount Turkey paid for the minerals it has to import registered an increase. The price of anthracite, one of Turkey's largest requirements, rose from \$30 last to \$32. In the 11 months covering January-November 1984, the foreign exchange that Turkey paid for mineral imports rose to \$217 million.

The mining sector holds a very small share of Turkey's GNP and foreign trade. Excluding foreign trade in crude oil and petroleum products, the mining sector accounts for 3.4 percent of Turkey's exports and 2.3 percent of imports. Turkey, not extremely rich in mineral reserves, has been unable to keep up with the international mineral market in the minerals in which it is abundant and thus has failed to get the prices it wants for the ones in which it has a "monopoly," such as boron. In fact, while it exported more onyx, natural crude borate, boron salts and antimony ore in 1984 than in 1983, it imported more iron and copper ores. Crude boron salts accounted for the largest share of mineral products exports for the 12 months of 1984, and anthracite was the highest in imports with 45 percent.

The 1985 program calls for a 6.3-percent increase in exports in the mining sector and a 2.3-percent increase in imports.

The most important position in Turkey's mineral exports is held by boron salts. In 1984, 554,000 tons of boron salts were exported for \$89,472,000. The unit price per ton of boron salts declined. The second most important item in mineral exports was chromium ore. There were \$30,932,000 in exports of chromium ore, in which the unit export price dropped from \$79.5 to \$78.3.

Magnesite exports rose 19.9 percent in quantity, but declined in value, with sales rising only to \$22,182,000. The unit price in magnesite exports dropped from \$232 to \$177.

Other important mineral product exports included borate at \$14,130,000, ferro-chromium at \$31,332,000, chromium at \$30,932,000 and tincal at \$27,840,000.

Developments in average export unit prices were: Salt, down from \$161 to \$131; barium sulfate, down from \$85 to \$70; bauxite, down from \$25 to \$15; molybdenum, down from \$2,489 to \$1,491; antimony, up from \$567 to \$1,145.

The biggest item in mineral products imports was anthracite at \$96,678,000. Imported anthracite cost \$73 in 1983 and \$67 in 1984. Anthracite is used chiefly in iron-steel works.

To meet the needs of the iron-steel industry, \$45,910,000 in iron ore was imported. Iron ore imported in 1983 was worth \$32,400,000. The average import unit price for iron ore rose from \$30 to \$32.

Natural phosphate imports for use in the fertilizer industry declined 50 percent and cost \$21.4 million. The import unit price for natural phosphate declined from \$47 to \$38.

Meanwhile, the 1985 program calls for an increase of 6.3 percent in mineral products exports. Exports in the program for 1985 are 505,880 tons of metals, 948,150 tons of nonmetallic minerals and 255,250 tons of quarry stone and construction materials. The major items in the export program consist of 38,600 tons of concentrated chromium, 394,000 tons of chromium ore, 68,000 tons of bauxite, 350 tons of mercury, 694,000 tons of boron salts, 7,200 tons of meerschaum, 43,600 tons of strontium carbonate, 123,000 tons of magnesite and 43,000 tons of marble.

Also, the program calls for imports of 2,080,000 tons of coal, 1,290,000 tons of iron ore, 28,600 tons of metals and 1,321,800 tons of non-metals (24,000 tons of manganese). Of the non-metal imports, 1,100,000 tons consist of phosphate.

Mining Exports Comparison for (Annual) Period January-December 1984

Mineral	Unit	1983			Difference			1984			Difference		
		Amount	\$1,000	Amount	\$1,000	Amount	Value	Mineral	Unit	Amount	\$1,000	Amount	Value
Alumina	ton	--	--	12412.2	2093	+		Calcium sulfate	ton	--	--	55	5
Aluminum, disk	"	13	25	23	48	+	76.9	Kaolin	"	5372	230	19202	714
Aluminum foil	"	0.30	12	--	--	--	--	Carbide	"	5320	1687	7296	2445
Aluminum, profile	"	--	--	684	1734	+	--	Welding rod	pkg	--	--	20	0.1
Alum., cold plate	"	--	--	15	28	+	--	Clay	ton	55081	1764	57526	2081
Antimony	"	1530	1356	244.5	3737	+	59.8	Angle iron	"	--	--	1500	352.5
Berite	"	149665	12684	208571	14130	+	39.3	Chromium	"	361137	26214	403951	30932
Basic Chrome sulfate	"	--	--	837	466	+	--	Quartz	"	46	8.5	--	--
Bentonite	"	5516.5	308	8193	485	+	48.5	Mearnsium	"	--	--	1.5	2.6
Bauxite	"	44330	755	46845	647	+	5.7	Magnetite	"	98009	22051	117518	22182
Borax	"	23332	6766	22029	6059	+	5.6	Marble	"	9924	1415	20819	918
Boric acid	"	16205	8364	26270	13062	+	62.1	"	M	124030	584	84099	334
Boron salts	"	409773	68978	554519	89472	+	35.3	"	M2	126139	2467	144162	2392
Mercury	kg	6595	1884	8672	2527	+	31.5	"	M3	3395	613	1388	345
Slag	ton	11445	103	--	--	--	--	"	each	5371	695	6755	536
Steel scrap	"	47.6	25	86	48	+	80.6	"	lot	322	67	85	201
Zinc ash	"	--	--	509	136	+	--	"	misc	--	--	--	--
Diatomite	"	15	1.5	89	4	+	493.3	Mica	ton	20	5	150	28
Dolomite	"	78	11	203	24	+	178.1	Molybdenum conc.	"	282	702	271	401.6
Feldspar	"	5130	264	1183.5	111	+	76.9	Perlite (Pearlite?)	"	3727	38	24757	204
Ferrochromium	"	33260	17899	57000	31312	+	71.4	Pumice stone	M3	1339	34	3196	90
Ferrosilica	"	22	10	--	--	--	--	Pyrite ash	ton	15.6	8	102.6	30
Ferrite	"	383	206	468	250	+	22.2	Sodium bichromate	"	--	--	16700	50
Granite	M2	5.2	0.5	--	--	--	--	Sodium perborate	"	--	--	735	465
"	M3	--	--	76.1	4	+	--	Strontium salts	"	5710	3131	6850	3879
Silver	kg	1336	715	--	--	--	--	Talc	"	37190	3908	49993	4809
Cadmium	ton	411	132.5	3280	832	+	698	Wolfram (scheelite)	"	769	110	912.5	128
Chalcodony	"	70	107	--	--	--	--	Emerald	"	217265	28720	220491	27840
Calcite	"	0.9	2.5	6.2	9	+	588.8	"	"	480	1252	452.5	1532
	"	3231	226	4040.5	250	+	25	"	"	22415	646	12530	519
								"	"	217309		270883.8(1)	

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